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Confiding in Con Men:  
U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries 
Lindsey Barrett* 
“We have a responsibility to protect your data, and if we 
can’t then we don’t deserve to serve you.” 
Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook1 
Zuck: yea so if you ever need info about anyone at Harvard 
Zuck: just ask 
Zuck: i have over 4000 emails, pictures, addresses, sns 
Friend: what!? how’d you manage that one? 
Zuck: people just submitted it 
Zuck: i don’t know why 
Zuck: they “trust me” 
Zuck: dumb fucks 
Id.2 
ABSTRACT 
In scope, ambition, and animating philosophy, U.S. privacy law and 
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation are almost diametric 
opposites. The GDPR’s ambitious individual rights, significant 
prohibitions, substantive enforcement regime, and broad applicability 
contrast vividly with a scattershot U.S. regime that generally prioritizes 
facilitating commerce over protecting individuals, and which has created 
                                                     
* Teaching Fellow & Staff Attorney, Communications & Technology Clinic, Institute for Public 
Representation, Georgetown University Law Center. An enormous thank you to the participants at the 
Seattle University Law Review GDPR Symposium, the Yale Information Society Project, Jack Balkin, 
Joe Jerome, and Gabriela Zanfir-Fortuna for their enormously helpful comments, and another to the 
hard-working editors at the Seattle University Law Review.  
 1. Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104 
712037900071 [https://perma.cc/WD94-ZRH8]. 
 2. Jose Antonio Vargas, The Face of Facebook: Mark Zuckerberg Opens Up, NEW YORKER 
(Sep. 20, 2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/09/20/the-face-of-facebook [https://per 
ma.cc/R9ML-2XBZ]. 
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perverse incentives for industry through anemic enforcement of the few 
meaningful limitations that do exist. A privacy law that characterizes data 
collectors as information fiduciaries could coalesce with the commercial 
focus of U.S. law, while emulating the GDPR’s laudable normative 
objectives and fortifying U.S. consumer privacy law with a moral valence 
it often lacks. Similar to classic fiduciaries like doctors or lawyers, 
information fiduciaries would owe duties of loyalty, care, and 
confidentiality to their clients—affirmative commitments to individuals 
that the laissez-faire approach of U.S. privacy law generally does not 
require. Fiduciary duties are also derived from the context of commercial 
relationships, where the law balances the professional prerogatives of the 
fiduciary with the rights (and vulnerabilities) of the client. Crucially, an 
information fiduciary model can strengthen protections for privacy, 
equality, and autonomy in the digital age, echoing the GDPR’s normative 
objectives, while balancing those principles with the competing aims (and 
constraints) of the U.S. legal ecosystem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is no longer any question that data collection can create 
privacy harms for individuals: the question is what the law can and should 
do about it. As various legal systems continue to produce a variety of 
answers, harmonizing the full gamut of approaches to privacy regulation 
in a globalized system is no small feat. 
In the United States, consumer privacy law is shaped around a 
conception of privacy as a good, and is heavily motivated by the desire to 
foster an innovative climate for U.S. companies.3 Data collection by 
private entities is governed by a patchwork of state and federal law that 
applies on a sectoral basis. If no sector-specific law applies—or the 
appropriate law excludes certain types of actors within the field, which is 
often the case4—the data collector is free to collect and use what it will, 
subject to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) unfairness and deception 
enforcement authority.5 The central goal of U.S. privacy law is to create 
an environment where industry experiments first and asks questions later, 
while privacy law that in any way hinders that ability is often criticized as 
paternalistic or retrogressive—or worse, European.6 
                                                     
 3. Paul Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 
132 (2017) (describing the “marketplace discourse” of privacy in the United States); see, e.g., Roslyn 
Layton & Julian McLendon, The GDPR: What It Really Does and How the U.S. Can Chart a Better 
Course, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 234, 235–36 (2018) (describing the “serious and negative 
unintended consequences” of the GDPR and arguing that “[t]he American notion of privacy is 
predicated in large part on freedom from government intrusion and as a counterweight to the growth 
of the administrative state”); Maureen Olhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at 
FTC Informational Injury Workshop 4 (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/1289343/mko_speech_-_info_injury_workshop_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/75JZ-
4VP9] (“But if there are no harms, then data use restrictions impose only costs and no benefits.”).  
 4. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2018). 
 5. This is true if the FTC has jurisdiction over the data collector, which is not always the case. 
The FTC does not have jurisdiction over common carriers, non-profits or other consumer areas where 
Congress has given oversight to another agency, such as the Federal Aviation Administration. 
 6. See Charlemagne: Waiting for Goodot, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.economist. 
com/europe/2018/10/13/europes-history-explains-why-it-will-never-produce-a-google?frsc=dg%7Ce 
[https://perma.cc/JC2W-RTP2] (“Asked whether the continent will ever produce its own Google, one 
burst out laughing.”); see, e.g., GDPR & CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on 
Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 13 (2019) 
(statement of Rosalyn Layton, Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute), https://www.judiciary. 
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Layton%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXX2-ALJM] (arguing, nine 
months after its implementation, that the GDPR has stymied innovation and the United States should 
“leapfrog” that regime with a more flexible approach); ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. 
TECH. INNOVATION FOUND., WHY STRONGER PRIVACY REGULATIONS DO NOT SPUR INCREASED 
INTERNET USE 2–3 (2018), http://www2.itif.org/2018-trust-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AB6-
BRXN] (“Aggressive regulatory policies, such as those deployed in GDPR, will likely do little to 
nothing to increase trust, but will limit digital innovation and raise costs, thereby reducing use relative 
to more balanced rules. It is time, therefore, to end the spurious claims that more privacy regulation is 
pro-innovation and pro-consumer.”). 
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In Europe, the conceptual and regulatory balance is reversed. As both 
privacy and data protection are considered fundamental human rights, 
legal protections for such rights are fulsome and tend to prioritize the 
protection of individual rights over ease of compliance for companies.7 
The EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) reflects these 
normative commitments in aspects like the range of individual rights it 
creates, the breadth of its definitions and jurisdiction, the affirmative 
requirements and prohibitions it creates for industry, and the enforcement 
regime that ensures those objectives are actually met. The law has been 
globally influential, due to both the breadth of its applicability and the 
other laws it has inspired.8 The ultimate impact of the GDPR’s reach 
remains to be seen as regulators start to apply it and business practices start 
to shift, but U.S. state and federal lawmakers have already begun asking 
whether “GDPR-style” protections in the United States are possible, 
advisable, or even inevitable.9 
As enthusiasm for new privacy regulation in the United States 
climbs, another approach to privacy regulation has been steadily gaining 
popularity: the idea of applying fiduciary duties like care, loyalty, and 
confidentiality to entities that collect digital information.10 The idea of the 
information fiduciary, proposed by law professor Jack Balkin, takes an 
established legal relationship arising out of certain circumstances of trust, 
sensitive information exchange, and reliance, and applies it to the context 
of companies that collect, process, and store enormous amounts of digital 
information about individuals. Classic fiduciary relationships include 
doctors and patients, lawyers and their clients, or investment advisors and 
their clients.11 These relationships are marked by the client trusting the 
fiduciary with sensitive information such that the fiduciary can provide a 
service that requires specialized skills or knowledge, and which the client 
cannot generally perform for herself. The resulting difficulty of 
supervision creates an incentive for the fiduciary to abuse the client’s trust. 
                                                     
 7. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 965–
66 (contrasting the U.S. and EU approaches, as well as detailing the difference between data protection 
and privacy law); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3 (contrasting the U.S. and EU approaches). 
 8. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 122 (calling the GDPR “stunningly influential” on privacy 
law around the globe). 
 9. Mark R. Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social Media and Technology 
Firms 15–16 (draft white paper), https://graphics.axios.com/pdf/PlatformPolicyPaper.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/C9BR-8CB7]; see also Cecilia Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, on Its 
Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/26/technology/tech-
industry-federal-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/QKQ4-2J2N]. 
 10. Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and 
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1152, 1162 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Free 
Speech]. 
 11. Id. at 1162. 
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To prevent the fiduciaries from taking advantage of their clients, and to 
facilitate rational reliance on professionals who offer services that are 
universally needed but not universally capable of being performed, courts 
and legislatures have created fiduciary duties of care, confidentiality, and 
loyalty that forbid self-dealing and other abuses of this power dynamic.12 
Balkin’s proposal would extend similar duties to entities that hold 
themselves out as ensuring privacy to their users, or in situations where 
consumers of a service or product that collects data reasonably believed 
that their data would not be misused.13 Jonathan Zittrain has similarly 
argued that given the ability of companies like Facebook to manipulate its 
users for opaque purposes, fiduciary duties could prevent data collectors14 
from self-dealing when their interests diverge from those of its users.15 
Doctors, lawyers, investment advisors, and other professionals are not 
permitted to act like “con men”16 toward the people who reasonably trust 
them with their information. Balkin, Zittrain, and others argue that Uber, 
AirBnb, or Venmo should not be able to either.17 
Applying duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality to data collectors 
injects a moral valence to broadly uphold users’ trust that U.S. privacy law 
generally does not require, and reverses the current presumption that data 
collectors generally bear no obligations to their users to a presumption that 
they do.18 Under U.S. privacy law, a private actor that does not fall under 
the specific definition of a narrowly defined sectoral statute can largely do 
whatever it wants with the data it collects or otherwise obtains, provided 
it does not lie about its actions and attract the attention of an overstretched 
                                                     
 12. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983). 
 13. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162. 
 14. Except where a more specific term is warranted, I generally refer to the practices of “data 
collectors.” This is to emphasize that while outsized harms may come from certain sectors and the 
incentives in need of remolding are primarily those of for-profit companies, the harms that a fiduciary 
framework would aim to prevent come from all corners of the digital ecosystem. Non-profits, 
universities, brick-and-mortar businesses and common carriers create many of the same types of issues 
that the digital platform companies do, and cannot be exempted from an effective fiduciary framework. 
 15. Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 340 (2014). 
 16. Jack Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fidu 
ciary/502346/ [https://perma.cc/B7H2-BRHN]. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Of course, U.S. privacy law already prohibits certain privacy-invasive practices. But the 
conception of privacy as a good, the focus on an easily navigated regulatory landscape, and the fact 
that the United States lacks a comprehensive privacy law have together created the understanding that 
to the extent that people accept an invasive practice, the government has no legitimate basis to prohibit 
it. Moreover, a rights-based approach assumes that the government has not only a basis but also an 
interest in ensuring that a threshold of protection exists. A duty of care is not as strong, but it creates 
the presumption of an obligation where one did not previously exist, while also adding a rights-like 
valence. 
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FTC.19 In contrast, the GDPR places the onus on companies to justify their 
data collection and use, given its paramount objective of protecting 
individual rights—but that law relies on constitutional rights to privacy 
and data protection that are not present in U.S. law, and a different legal 
and historical understanding of privacy. 
Classifying data collectors as information fiduciaries would not 
create an equivalent constitutional privacy right in the United States, like 
the one supporting the GDPR, but it would help correct the power 
imbalance between companies and individuals. Placing affirmative duties 
on data collectors deters exploitation of users, while a regime of 
“permissionless innovation” incentivizes it. Moreover, duties of care, 
loyalty, and confidentiality can be crafted and interpreted to forbid a 
broader array of digital harms that privacy law generally does not prevent, 
such as digital discrimination and manipulation. At the same time, an 
information fiduciary model may be more flexible and coalesce better with 
existing U.S. privacy law than the GDPR can, particularly as the fiduciary 
relationship arises in a commercial context and can accommodate the 
fiduciary’s competing rights, professional objectives, and obligations that 
are also worthy of protection.20 While U.S. privacy law often prioritizes 
companies over individuals and the GDPR is built upon constitutional 
rights against private entities that do not exist in U.S. law, an information 
fiduciary model can accommodate certain commercial objectives 
alongside a commitment to normative values such as privacy, autonomy, 
and equality that the law should uphold.21 
This Article will begin with a brief background on the concept of 
information fiduciaries and traditional fiduciary law. It will then provide 
an overview of the stark asymmetry between companies and individuals 
in U.S. privacy law, including the marketplace focus of “consumer” 
privacy, the limits of U.S. privacy law to protect individuals from evolving 
digital harms, and weak enforcement. Part III will discuss the GDPR and 
its focus on the fundamental privacy rights of data subjects. Part IV will 
then describe how a fiduciary framework could coalesce with U.S. law 
while strengthening protections for individuals, even without an 
equivalent constitutional basis like the one undergirding the GDPR. Part 
V will address additional considerations. 
                                                     
 19. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 431, 470 (2016). 
 20. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 12, at 802 (“A fiduciary society attempts to maximize both the 
satisfaction of needs and the protection of freedom . . . . It permits the government to moderate 
between altruistic goals and individualistic, selfish desires, as well as between the social goal of 
increasing the common welfare and the individual desire to appropriate more than a ‘fair share.’”). 
 21. Id. 
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I. BACKGROUND ON INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES 
As this Article will explain, the U.S. model of privacy regulation and 
the European model generally represent two extremes: “permissionless 
innovation” on one end and a strong commitment to individual rights on 
the other. Though divergent, the two approaches can still be mutually 
compatible in certain ways, and U.S. law would benefit from many of the 
legal innovations that the GDPR creates. State legislatures have already 
begun to emulate certain aspects of the GDPR, and some state 
constitutions already contain a right to privacy like the one undergirding 
the European law.22 
But even if there were sufficient appetite from policymakers to 
incorporate the GDPR wholesale into federal law, the information 
fiduciary model coalesces better with the U.S. legal ecosystem than the 
GDPR can.23 The concept of the fiduciary is deliberately designed to 
accommodate the needs and commercial prerogatives of the service 
provider, while recognizing that exploitation of the recipient’s 
vulnerability is inevitable, undesirable, and legally preventable.24 A 
fiduciary framework would not go so far as to create an equivalent 
constitutional right to privacy against private entities in the U.S., like the 
constitutional right that undergirds the GDPR. But affirmative duties 
based on the premise that individuals should be protected from digital 
exploitation can help correct the power imbalance between data subjects 
and data collectors, and transform how digital rights are understood.25 
Even without relying on a constitutional right to privacy, an information 
fiduciary framework would expand the kinds of harms that would be 
protected, while injecting a moral valence into a policy discussion that 
often lacks it. Finally, while this Article does not focus on the GDPR’s 
incompatibility with U.S. law from a free expression standpoint, the 
fiduciary model is better equipped to accommodate the First Amendment 
in a way the GDPR is not.26 Ultimately, the information fiduciary model 
                                                     
 22. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Eleven states have constitutional 
rights to privacy. Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-
in-state-constitutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/8JZB-KHZC]. 
 23. See, e.g., Tim Wu, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/europe-america-privacy-gdpr.html [https:// 
perma.cc/NP8W-39LL]. 
 24. See generally Frankel, supra note 12. 
 25. Compare with Frankel’s argument that “[as] the entrustor should pay only for the benefits 
gained from the relation. . . . [F]air fiduciary law would shift the costs of protecting against abuse of 
power away from the entrustor to the fiduciary and the courts.” Id. at 834. 
 26. JACK M. BALKIN, HOOVER INST., AEGIS SERIES PAPER NO. 1814, FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S 
GRAND BARGAIN 14 (2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webrea 
dypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5TW-G2XZ]. 
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provides distinct advantages over the status quo of U.S. law that are 
inherent to the concept itself, but it also strikes a balance between the 
divergent approaches to privacy on each side of the Atlantic,27 making it a 
fitting approach to U.S. privacy governance in a GDPR world. 
While there is no sole definition of what constitutes a fiduciary or 
how the fiduciary relationship is created,28 it generally arises when a 
person or entity relies on another with superior skills or knowledge for a 
service that they cannot easily perform themselves, based on the latter’s 
expertise.29 Providing a professional with sensitive information such that 
she can perform a service the client is unable to perform herself necessarily 
requires the fiduciary to have superior knowledge and makes her actions 
difficult for the client to effectively monitor.30 The beneficiary must 
therefore trust that the fiduciary will accomplish the beneficiary’s 
objectives as promised, which the law secures by placing duties of loyalty, 
care, and confidentiality on the fiduciary to prevent her from leveraging 
that dynamic to her advantage. Relationships in different contexts may 
give rise to different duties, but they typically include a duty of loyalty to 
the client, a duty of confidentiality, and a duty of care.31 Classic examples 
of the fiduciary relationship include a doctor’s duty to her patient, a lawyer 
to her client,32 a union leader negotiating on behalf of workers,33 or a 
trustee managing a trust on behalf of the trust’s beneficiary.34 
From a public policy standpoint, the state has an interest in protecting 
these relationships and ensuring that the client can rely on the fiduciary 
without fear that her information would be compromised. Violations could 
mean the suspension or forfeiture of a license to practice,35 the cost of the 
                                                     
 27. A rough analogy can be drawn with Frankel’s description of classic fiduciary law: “[T]he 
moral feature of fiduciary law forms a bridge between altruism and individualism by focusing on the 
objectives towards which the fiduciary must aim.” Frankel, supra note 12, at 832. Similarly, the 
information fiduciary model forms a bridge between the EU model’s more idealistic focus on rights 
and the United States’ focus on corporate growth. 
 28. New fiduciary relationships have been created over time, and a new one would not be unusual 
from the perspective of fiduciary law. See id. at 805. 
 29. See Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162 (discussing information fiduciaries); Ariel 
Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2017) (defining fiduciaries); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary 
Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 519 (2015) (“Conventional fiduciary relationships are 
formed between fiduciaries and beneficiaries, and found an interpersonal form of accountability, 
realized through assignment of correlative rights and duties between the parties.”). 
 30. Frankel, supra note 12, at 803–04 (describing how specialization and pooling enabled the 
development of the fiduciary relationship). 
 31. See Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1161. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Frankel, supra note 12, at 795. 
 34. Id. at 805–06. 
 35. See, e.g., MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); 
FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATOR TRENDS AND ACTIONS 2018, at 7 (2018), 
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disciplinary proceedings,36 tort liability for malpractice,37 or liability under 
other state laws.38 The possibility of these kinds of punishment help to 
deter fiduciaries from exploiting power imbalances to their advantage. In 
addition to deterring violations by sanctioning errant fiduciaries, the law 
further reflects this normative tradeoff by limiting First Amendment 
protections for the fiduciary when she might otherwise wish to share the 
client’s information39 or providing an evidentiary shield when she might 
wish to avoid being legally compelled to divulge it.40 
Ultimately, the relationship depends on trust: an expert seeking to 
perform services based on her superior knowledge needs to give potential 
clients a reason to trust her, and individuals seeking a service they 
themselves cannot perform must be able to trust the fiduciary on a more 
reliable basis than an irrational degree of good faith. The legal duties 
supplied by the fiduciary relationship enable this reliance. The fiduciary 
relationship is a commercial one—but with an unmistakably moral 
valence.41 
II. U.S. PRIVACY LAW 
The information fiduciary model is a vivid contrast to the status quo 
of U.S. privacy law. U.S. privacy protections are hobbled by U.S. privacy 
law’s predominant objective of facilitating a robust environment for 
technological innovation and philosophically weakened by a conception 
of privacy as a good to be traded away, rather than a right to be protected. 
While the federal Constitution provides rights to privacy from the 
government, it does not provide the same protections for privacy from 
private entities, contributing to a diminished perception of the normative 
imperative of those protections in policy discussions.42 In the seeming 
absence of a compelling basis to protect it, privacy from companies has 
come to be discussed as a commodity or a privilege that individuals should 
                                                     
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/us-medical-regulatory-trends-actions.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/D7GQ-LUT9]. 
 36. See generally Neil Gordon, Misconduct and Punishment: State Disciplinary Authorities 
Investigate Prosecutors Accused of Misconduct, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 24, 2018), https: 
//publicintegrity.org/accountability/misconduct-and-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/YMZ5-J9FW]. 
 37. See generally Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 557 (2009) (detailing the tort regimes applicable to doctors and lawyers and arguing for 
a betrayal-based cause of action). 
 38. See generally Robert Kutcher, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, in BUSINESS TORTS LITIGATION 
1 (Ann E. Georgehead et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).  
 39. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1161. 
 40. Id. at 1161 n.30. 
 41. See BALKIN, supra note 26, at 11 (describing fiduciary law as “the law that governs the 
professions”); Frankel, supra note 12, at 830–32. 
 42. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 133–34. 
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always have the prerogative to give up, while regulation that in any way 
inhibits their ability to do so is frequently decried as paternalistic and anti-
innovation.43 The conception of privacy as a good rather than a right is 
thus used to argue against strong consumer privacy protections that might 
hinder corporate success.44 As the United States debates the merits of a 
possible comprehensive privacy law, this focus on regulatory flexibility 
for business is still heavily represented by the Trump Administration,45 its 
                                                     
 43. See id. at 119; see also McGeveran, supra note 7, at 975 (describing the “libertarian” 
approach to privacy taken by the U.S. Constitution); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 441 
(critiquing the “harm fixation” in U.S. privacy law, arguing that “from this perspective, privacy is an 
injury to be remedied, a cost to be balanced in the ledger book, a harm rather than an opportunity” and 
noting that “critics of privacy regulation bemoan its toll on ‘innovation’ and ‘progress’”). 
 44. See, e.g., Olhausen, supra note 3, at 4 (“But if there are no harms, then data use restrictions 
impose only costs and no benefits.”). 
 45. Tony Romm, The Trump Administration is Talking to Facebook and Google About Potential 
Rules for Online Privacy, WASH. POST (July 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/ 
2018/07/27/trump-administration-is-working-new-proposal-protect-online-privacy/?utm_term=.0cd8 
f9076e05 (White House Deputy Press Secretary stating that “the Trump Administration aims to craft 
a consumer privacy protection policy that is the appropriate balance between privacy and 
prosperity . . . .”); Senate Panel Opens Hearing on Crafting US Privacy Law, VOICE OF AMERICA 
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/a/senate-panel-opens-hearing-on-crafting-us-privacy-
law/4588164.html [https://perma.cc/D2TT-E9SK] (The same Deputy Press Secretary stating that the 
White House “look[ed] forward to working with Congress on a legislative solution” that strikes “the 
appropriate balance between privacy and prosperity . . . .”). 
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agencies that work on privacy,46 and the tech companies47 and their 
surrogates.48 
                                                     
 46. See Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600–01 (Sept. 21, 2018), (describing the 
Trump’s Administration’s ideal approach to privacy as “a risk-management approach, one that affords 
organizations flexibility and innovation in how to achieve these outcomes”); Federal Trade 
Commission, Comment Letter on the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s 
Approach to Consumer Privacy 8–11 (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ 
federal_trade_commission_staff_comment_to_ntia_11.9.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C78C-QQJM] 
(noting that the FTC supports “a balanced approach to privacy that weighs the risks of data misuse 
with the benefits of data to innovation and competition,” that “any approach to privacy must also 
consider how consumer data fuels innovation and competition,” and emphasizing that privacy 
regulation should not unduly constrain innovation); Kang, supra note 9 (quoting David Redl, Assistant 
Secretary for Communications and Information at NTIA, that “commitment to prosperity will be our 
guide” on how privacy should be regulated); Olhausen, supra note 3, at 4; Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. 
Commc’n Comm’n, Remarks at the Newseum 1 (Dec. 12, 2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/ 
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0427/DOC-344590A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2MN-CTL7] 
(calling the internet “the greatest free-market success story in history” in part due to the 
Telecommunications Acts’ animating objective “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market 
that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation”). 
 47. While for years the tech companies have taken a more explicitly anti-regulatory posture, the 
current regulatory climate has produced a different strategy, namely a posture of cooperation and 
openness to regulation as a means to stave off more significant regulatory intervention. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Confessore, The Unlikely Activists Who Took on Silicon Valley—And Won, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/magazine/facebook-google-privacy-
data.html [https://perma.cc/6S5V-27YX] (describing the tech companies’ aggressive lobbying against 
CCPA, and how the Cambridge Analytica revelations “forced Facebook to take complaints about 
privacy more seriously—or, at least, to sound as if it did”); Sheera Frenkel et al., Delay, Deny and 
Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html?rref= 
collection%2Fbyline%2Fcecilia-kang [https://perma.cc/VMS7-QVW6] (describing how Facebook 
“broke ranks with other tech companies, hoping the move would help repair relations on both sides of 
the aisle” in its support for SESTA/FOSTA); Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook and Twitter 
Have a Message for Lawmakers: We’re Trying, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/09/04/technology/facebook-and-twitter-have-a-message-for-lawmakers-were-
trying.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fcecilia-kang [https://perma.cc/7U8U-FG2Q] (describing 
the “conciliatory and apologetic approach” Sheryl Sandberg and Jack Dorsey planned to take as they 
testified before Congress). Facebook has also presented a public face of being open to regulation while 
quietly lobbying against it behind closed doors, as have other tech companies. Kang, supra note 9 
(describing aggressive lobbying Facebook, Google, IBM, and others for a “kinder set of rules” and 
how Facebook and Google “softened their resistance to a federal privacy law, as long as they were 
deeply involved in writing the rules”); Lee Fang, Google and Facebook Are Quietly Fighting 
California’s Privacy Rights Initiative, Emails Reveal, INTERCEPT (June 26, 2018), https://theintercept. 
com/2018/06/26/google-and-facebook-are-quietly-fighting-californias-privacy-rights-initiative-
emails-reveal/ [https://perma.cc/4SED-NQZ7] (describing how Facebook publicly supported CCPA 
while lobbying California lawmakers and donating money, along with Google, AT&T, Microsoft, 
Amazon, and Verizon, to defeat it).  
 48. See, e.g., Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications 
Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274–75 (Dec. 2, 2016) (describing the Final Rule nullifying the FCC’s 
broadband privacy rule as “designed to protect consumer choice while giving broadband providers the 
flexibility they need to continue to innovate”); Daniel Castro & Alan McQuinn, Info. Tech. & 
Innovation Found., Comment Letter on the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy 4 (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ 
ntia/publications/2018-ntia-privacy-comments-itif.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFS6-ND3K] (arguing that a 
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The structural flaws of U.S. privacy law are exacerbated by the idea 
of privacy as a good. Without a more legally and conceptually fulsome 
right to privacy—rather than a right to trade it away—the basis for legal 
reforms seems weaker, and the arguments for the status quo are given more 
credence. The lack of a constitutional right to privacy from private entities 
has thus helped facilitate the construction of a consumer privacy regime 
primarily concerned with ease of compliance for companies, and shielded 
it from more consumer-protective modifications. The patchy protections 
of sectoral regulation, the failures of notice and choice without strong 
enforcement to compensate for them, and the narrow definitions of what 
kinds of harms merit judicial or administrative redress reflect this 
conceptual and legal diminishment of privacy, and often keep protections 
for it from being effective. 
A. Sectoral Regulation 
The fractal nature of privacy protections for individuals against 
private entities in the United States largely reflects a prioritization of 
corporate flexibility over individual rights. While an omnibus regime 
assumes that data collection should be justified, a sectoral regime assumes 
that any governmental limits on collection should be justified. As noted 
above, privacy from private entities is generally not protected by the U.S. 
Constitution.49 Instead, an array of sector-specific state and federal statutes 
have established data collection and use limitations when legislatures 
determine a specific need for that particular industry, rather than by 
limitations on all data collection and use by default.50 Statutes like HIPAA, 
FERPA, COPPA, GINA, GLBA and FCRA cover health information,51 
students’ information,52 children’s online information,53 genetic 
information,54 and financial information55 respectively. 
                                                     
federal privacy framework should “increase, not undermine, innovation,” including by considering 
“the economic costs of any piece of privacy legislation or enforcement action,” as “[o]verly strict data 
protection regulations can adversely impact innovation”). 
 49. As McGeveran notes in Friending the Privacy Regulator, courts have inferred rights to 
privacy in discrete areas not explicit in the text, but “[t]his constitutional jurisprudence does not confer 
any broad right to control personal information equivalent to European human rights to data 
protection.” McGevran, supra note 7, at 976; see also Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 133–34. 
 50. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 973–74 (describing the “smorgasbord” of privacy statutes that 
arose in response to “narrowly defined problems and [which] applies solely to the type of data 
connected with that problem”); see also id. at 977 (“Consumer protection law is tied to the inequitable 
nature of the underlying transaction, not to individual rights over personal data.”). 
 51. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2018). 
 52. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–5 (2012). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 6801 (2012). 
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But even within the sectors that appear to be covered by pertinent 
statutes, narrow definitions cabin the applicability of such laws and the 
protections they appear to offer. For example, the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the statute governing collection of 
student data, applies to public school officials or those they designate.56 It 
does not apply to any other entity that collects student data, such as a 
company that provides an official-looking survey as part of a test students 
are required to take, and then sells the information to data brokers.57 
Another example is the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA), the statute governing misuse of genetic data, which only prohibits 
the use in employment or insurance decisions.58 While that is a good start, 
it does nothing to curb the behavior of consumer genetics companies, 
which are not otherwise subject to it, nor does it hamper any other use of 
genetic information other than in the insurance or employment contexts.59 
As another example, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which protects health privacy, only applies 
to information collected by a healthcare provider.60 Any other collection 
or use of health information, for instance, by a healthcare startup selling 
predictive judgments on patients to insurance companies, or a period-
tracking app hawking assessments of the likelihood that its users will 
conceive to their employers,61 is not covered by the law.62 Other sector-
                                                     
 56. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
 57. See Catherine Gewertz, Students with Disabilities Sue ACT over Release of Personal 
Information, EDUC. WEEK (Aug. 28, 2018), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/high_school_and_ 
beyond/2018/08/students_with_disabilities_sue_act_over_release_of_personal_information.html 
[https://perma.cc/H88G-Y4JA] (describing a lawsuit brought by high school students alleging that the 
standardized testing company ACT collected and sold information about their learning disabilities to 
colleges. The suit rests on several federal and state laws, including the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and the California constitutional right to privacy, but not FERPA); Natasha Singer, For Sale: 
Survey Data on Millions of High School Students, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/07/29/business/for-sale-survey-data-on-millions-of-high-school-students.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4666-X6BV] (describing how marketing programs collect and sell information about 
students, untrammeled by FERPA). 
 58. See Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED (Aug. 
3, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-pharma-deal/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3S8U-KSYV]. 
 59. See, e.g., id. 
 60. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2018). 
 61. Naomi Kresge, Ilya Khrennikov & David Ramli, Period-Tracking Apps Are Monetizing 
Women’s Extremely Personal Data, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-24/how-period-tracking-apps-are-monetizing-women-s-
extremely-personal-data [https://perma.cc/8QN9-MS6G]. 
 62. See Marshall Allen, Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You—And It Could 
Raise Your Rates, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/health-insurers-
are-vacuuming-up-details-about-you-and-it-could-raise-your-rates [https://perma.cc/X9B4-7G5Z]; 
Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Sloan Kettering’s Cozy Deal with Start-Up Ignites a New Uproar, 
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specific, definitionally limited federal privacy laws are the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the two 
primary federal statutes that govern financial privacy. These two laws 
similarly rest on specific definitions of whom the law applies to and under 
what context it applies to them. GLBA applies to financial institutions 
(companies that offer consumers financial products or services like loans, 
financial or investment advice, or insurance) but ultimately provides fairly 
weak protections for consumers, as it simply requires covered entities to 
give consumers a right to opt out of having their information shared.63 And 
while FCRA offers somewhat stronger protections, it only applies to 
consumer reporting agencies.64 Thus, when an entity not fitting those 
descriptions—such as Facebook, Google, or a data broker—buys, sells, or 
shares financial information, such as credit card transactions, GLBA and 
FCRA do not apply. A sectoral approach means that entire areas are 
necessarily left open for exploitation due to reasons as unsatisfying as 
historical accident, industry pressure, or congressional inertia.65 These 
narrowly defined laws also frequently fail to protect against new kinds of 
digital harms, such as manipulation or discrimination.66 
The priorities of a sectoral approach are clear. This approach asks 
whether some new category of data must be regulated, because unless the 
harm occurring in the absence of regulation is particularly severe, the 
possible side effects of constraining industry practice should be considered 
more harmful to society than the invasions of privacy that intervention 
would seek to prevent.67 In comparison, a comprehensive privacy law 
                                                     
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/health/memorial-sloan-kettering-
cancer-paige-ai.html [https://perma.cc/B42V-GEE6]. 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). 
 64. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 
ACT, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
GLD9-586H]. 
 65. See, e.g., Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 360–61 (2015) (detailing the failures of various federal privacy bills, both 
comprehensive and sectoral); Alvaro M. Bedoya, Why Silicon Valley Lobbyists Love Big, Broad 
Privacy Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/opinion/silicon-
valley-lobbyists-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/S8GT-W736]. 
 66. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 62 (noting that HIPPA does not limit the ability of insurance 
companies to surreptitiously use personal data purchased from data brokers to make medical 
assumptions that could lead to increased insurance prices); Adam Entous & Ronan Farrow, Private 
Mossad for Hire, NEW YORKER (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/02/18/ 
private-mossad-for-hire [https://perma.cc/83PT-SDC9] (describing the tactics of Israeli firms that 
specialize in digital manipulation campaigns, and discussing those firms’ claims to legal legitimacy 
and the extent to which “regulations haven’t kept pace with advances in technology”). 
 67. Confessore, supra note 47 (describing the anger and frustration of privacy advocates with 
how industry pressure molded the Obama Administration’s comprehensive privacy framework until 
it “retreat[ed] from the idea of consumer privacy as an inherent right,” and that “[m]ost of the bill’s 
protections applied only if collecting or using a given piece of information posed a serious risk of 
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starts with the premise that data practices should be prudently regulated to 
ensure the right to privacy is protected, rather than regulated as sparingly 
as possible.68 The comprehensive approach assumes that privacy has a 
fundamental value for individuals, and the government should, as a part of 
maximizing any number of normative objectives for its constituents, 
ensure those protections. A sectoral approach prioritizes the ability of 
industry to move fast and break things, and subordinates strong privacy 
protections for individuals in favor of corporate flexibility to exploit 
them.69 
B. The Failure of Notice & Choice 
U.S. privacy laws also suffer from weaknesses that are not uniquely 
American, such as heavy reliance on notice and choice, a method of 
privacy regulation which promises transparency and agency but delivers 
neither. But while the GDPR still relies on notice and choice, it both 
recognizes its weaknesses and provides compensatory measures to 
account for them, such as requiring meaningful consent, prohibiting 
services from being contingent on coercive consent, assessing high fines 
for violations, and including transparency and access rights for 
individuals, as well as meaningful methods of administrative and judicial 
redress.70 In contrast, U.S. privacy laws lack most of these compensatory 
measures, while still depending on the fiction that notice and choice 
provides individuals with control over their digital selves.71 
                                                     
economic or emotional harm”); Olhausen, supra note 3, at 4 (“Government does the most good with 
the fewest unintended side effects when it focuses on addressing actual or likely substantial consumer 
injury instead of expending resources to prevent trivial or purely hypothetical injuries. . . . [I]f there 
are no harms, then data use restrictions impose only costs and no benefits.”). 
 68. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 966 (characterizing the “default rule” for privacy regulation as 
the most significant difference between the EU and U.S. regimes: “[I]n the United States, it is usually 
allowed unless the law says that it is not, while in the E.U. it is not allowed unless the law says that it 
is.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Oriana Senatore, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Comment Letter on 
FTC Informational Injury Workshop 3–4 (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_comments/2017/10/00023-141551.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF4T-LTAS] (“To fully 
achieve the maximum positive impact, organizations must be able to collect, share, and use 
information, subject to contractual limits and reasonable consumer protections to prevent fraud and 
deception, on the one hand, and without the threat of over-burdensome and disproportionate 
liability.”); Brookman, supra note 65, at 361 (describing a House hearing on comprehensive privacy 
legislative “tellingly” titled “Internet Privacy: The Impact and Burden of EU Regulation” as part of 
the “death knell” that rang for the law as soon as President Obama endorsed it). 
 70. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 27, 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
art. 9(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 38 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].  
 71. See generally James Cooper, Program on Economics & Privacy, Comment Letter on FTC 
Information Injury Workshop (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_ 
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Fundamentally, “notice and choice” is a misnomer when few privacy 
notices offer sufficiently meaningful information capable of influencing 
the user’s ultimate decision, and when a choice of whether to accept all 
the terms offered or simply seek a different product is often no choice at 
all.72 Notice and choice has been roundly criticized by policymakers,73 
academics,74 social scientists,75 advocates,76 and others77 for quite some 
time, and with good reason. The idea that a generic description of a 
company’s practices could possibly provide a sufficient disclaimer as to 
what data a company collects and how the data is used begs credulity; 
considering that the description is generally written in ten-point font and 
inscrutable legalese, is buried on the company’s website, and is one of an 
unmanageable number that individuals encounter in a day, the proposition 
is laughable. People encounter so many privacy policies in their daily lives 
that it would be irrational to read each of them—one study calculated that 
it would take the average person 200 hours per year.78 There are also all 
kinds of cognitive phenomena that prevent individuals from obtaining 
meaningful information from privacy policies in the way that a notice and 
                                                     
comments/2017/10/00019-141547.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN8M-VDG2] (arguing that the discrepancy 
between stated preferences and outcomes in privacy decision-making mediated by notice and choice 
should not compel strong privacy protections). 
 72. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Life Without the Tech Giants, GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2019), https:// 
gizmodo.com/life-without-the-tech-giants-1830258056 [https://perma.cc/6VT5-P9FR] (documenting 
the veteran technology journalist’s struggle, and occasional failure, to completely extricate Amazon, 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple from her life). 
 73. Brian Fung, ‘Your User Agreement Sucks’: Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Grilling, in 10 Key 
Moments, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/ 
04/10/your-user-agreement-sucks-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-grilling-in-10-key-moments/?utm_term= 
.e5b32914b30c [https://perma.cc/63MX-R9XE] (quoting Joe Kennedy criticizing Facebook’s privacy 
policy by saying “your user agreement sucks”). 
 74. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 
J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008); see, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair 
Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 952 n.1 (2017); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 
444 (describing the failure of notice and choice and criticizing the “control illusion”). 
 75. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between 
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39 (2015); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 
Does “Notice and Choice” Disclosure Regulation Work? An Empirical Study of Privacy Policies (Apr. 
2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawandeconomics 
/workshops/Documents/Paper13.Marotta-Wurgler.Does%20Notice%20and%20Choice%20Disclosur 
e%20Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY8P-VUU5]. 
 76. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment Letter on the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy (Nov. 9, 
2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/epic-ntia-nov2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
98Y3-STMJ]. 
 77. Editorial, How Silicon Valley Puts the ‘Con’ in Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/opinion/internet-facebook-google-consent.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2XF6-ETJH]. 
 78. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 74, at 564. 
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choice regime assumes they do, such as hyperbolic discounting and 
optimism bias.79 
In addition to the difficulty of locating privacy policies, interpreting 
them, and the other highly legitimate reasons that people have to not read 
privacy policies at all, many people do not understand their purpose. One 
survey found that 65% of respondents did not know that the statement 
“[w]hen a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my 
information with other websites and companies without my permission” 
was incorrect.80 Finally, “notice and choice” implies that a disclaimer 
regime requires companies to offer alternatives to practices the individual 
would prefer to prohibit. In reality, U.S. privacy policies are not required 
to offer alternatives that would enable the person to still use the product or 
service. It’s not notice and choice, it’s take it or leave it, and in most 
situations, “leaving it” is not a practical or even feasible option. 
The end result of a notice and choice regime is a feasible mechanism 
for companies to demonstrate compliance, not a mechanism that 
prioritizes that people understand how their information is collected or 
used. The focus is on the procedure provided, not the outcome for the 
individual. A legal regime that relies on notice and choice can compensate 
for some of its weaknesses by providing additional rights for individuals, 
such as a private right of action to sue when their rights are violated, 
creating a higher threshold for what constitutes consent to a privacy policy, 
or strengthening accountability measures by empowering regulators with 
additional resources, enforcement powers, or expansive jurisdiction. The 
GDPR employs these kinds of mechanisms that are intended to 
compensate for the deficiencies of notice and choice. U.S. privacy law, for 
the most part, does not. 
C. The Limits of FTC Enforcement 
U.S. privacy protections are further hobbled by another practical 
limitation—the resources that are allocated for consumer privacy 
policymaking and the kind of enforcement authority regulators are 
permitted to wield. The Federal Trade Commission is the primary federal 
agency charged with protecting individuals from digital exploitation in a 
commercial context, including data privacy, security, and misuse by 
companies.81 Its authority to police unfair and deceptive practices helps to 
                                                     
 79. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1008 (2014) 
(describing the literature on cognitive biases that skew rational consumer behavior, such as optimism 
bias, information overload, anchoring, confirmation, and framing). 
 80. JOSEPH TURROW ET AL., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY 4 (2015), https://www.asc.upenn.edu/ 
sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/78ZC-FPL7]. 
 81. State attorneys general also play an important role. See generally Danielle Citron, The 
Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2017). 
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fill in some of the gaps left by the sectoral regime. For example, while only 
an employer or health insurance company’s use of genetic information is 
subject to GINA, any company in the FTC’s jurisdiction that used the 
information in a way that would constitute an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice would be subject to the FTC’s oversight.82 Ultimately, the 
agency’s ability to police abusive privacy practices is severely curtailed 
by the limits of its statutory authority, its reactive rather than proactive 
approach to shaping privacy practices, and the sheer size of the job in 
comparison to the agency’s available manpower, legal tools, and monetary 
resources.83 Reticence to enforce also seems to play a role.84 
As the sole backstop for the weaknesses of the rest of U.S. consumer 
privacy law, one agency can only do so much. To start, the FTC’s authority 
does not include common carriers or non-profits, a limitation that some, 
like former Commissioner Terrell McSweeny and current Chairman Joe 
Simons, have argued should be lifted.85 In an echo of how sectoral privacy 
laws leave broad swaths of conduct unregulated almost by happenstance, 
the FTC’s lack of authority over common carriers leaves these entities free 
to violate people’s privacy with near impunity. The agency also lacks 
general rulemaking authority, which means that its approach to shaping 
industry practice is primarily reactive, rather than proactive.86 It polices 
industry practice on a case-by-case basis, in an approach that some have 
argued resembles how the common law builds on precedent and 
                                                     
 82. As well as being subject to state privacy and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 
(UDAP) laws. 
 83. See, e.g., Hal Singer, The Latest Facebook Scandal Is Also a Crisis for the FTC, SLATE (Dec. 
19, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/12/facebook-privacy-scandal-ftc-crisis.html [https:// 
perma.cc/NXF9-P428]. 
 84. Cecilia Kang & Nicholas Confessore, Facebook Data Scandals Stoke Criticism That a 




 85. Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial Intelligence & Bots: Is 
The FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514, 529 (2018); see also Oversight of the Federal 
Trade Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. 4 
(2018) (responses to written questions submitted to Joseph J. Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n), 
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f15ec1e0-e736-44ce-912c-cb3c2dcdef10/102 
6963B4F5AA34FBDE922224104B601.majority-qfrs---joseph-j.-simons.pdf [https://perma.cc/97CJ-
WB55] (“[T]he FTC could use broader enforcement authority to take action against common carriers 
and nonprofits.”); McGeveran, supra note 7, at 977 (noting that the FTC’s authorities do not extend 
to some financial institutions, telecommunications carriers, and airlines). 
 86. McSweeny, supra note 85, at 515 (describing the FTC as “the nation’s primary consumer 
data protection agency”). 
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establishes principles through the adjudication of individual 
controversies.87 
Further, the FTC typically uses its deception authority in privacy and 
data security cases and rarely relies on its unfairness authority, with the 
latter requiring the agency to reach the lofty threshold of “a clear theory 
of substantial likelihood of harm to consumers that is not outweighed by 
any countervailing benefits.”88 The outsized role of deception in the FTC’s 
policy means privacy abuses are limited to whether or not a company is 
forthright about its practices, regardless of whether the practice itself is 
inherently abusive, and to an often overly narrow view of what kind of 
injury constitutes a “material” harm.89 As the vast majority of privacy 
policies are difficult to understand and rarely read, this reliance on 
deception leaves the FTC’s enforcement as a fairly narrow sliver: an 
entirely truthful privacy policy is still a capable shield for practices that 
contravene consumer expectations or are otherwise exploitative.90 
Moreover, the agency’s inability to level fines on the first instance of a 
company’s malfeasance curtails its ability to deter such behavior.91 
Even conduct that would appear to fit squarely within what the FTC 
would enforce can go unpunished, whether it is because of the agency’s 
narrow definitions of informational harm, its limited enforcement 
authority, its lack of resources, or even institutional torpor.92 While data 
                                                     
 87. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 607 (2014). 
 88. McSweeny, supra note 85, at 522; see also G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, 
and FTC Enforcement: Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 163, 165 (2012) (describing the FTC’s reticent approach to exercising its unfairness 
authority in privacy enforcement and arguing for a more aggressive approach). 
 89. Katie McInnis, Consumers Union, Comment Letter to the FTC Informational Injury 
Workshop 1–2 (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/ 
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deception cases, and that “the Commission should not further hamstring itself in its mission to protect 
consumer interests”); Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 361–63 
(2014). 
 90. Google and Facebook, for example, both were reportedly tracking user location despite 
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https://gizmodo.com/turning-off-facebook-location-tracking-doesnt-stop-it-f-1831149148 [https:// 
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breaches continue to rise in ubiquity and scale,93 the action being taken to 
deter or prevent them is often unclear or unsatisfying, particularly as the 
FTC generally refuses to comment even on egregious cases.94 
In a recent and notorious example, Facebook gave researchers 
affiliated with British political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica 
access to information on millions of its users without the users’ consent, 
which Cambridge Analytica then used to attempt to persuade users to vote 
for its clients.95 When Facebook found out what had happened, it hid that 
information from regulators, users, and the public.96 This is an enormous 
abuse of its users’ trust, and yet the question of whether the company 
would be punished by the FTC was initially somehow still uncertain,97 
despite the fact that the company was already under a consent decree with 
the FTC for sharing user information with third parties without their 
consent.98 While it now seems likely that Facebook will face a large 
financial penalty for its misconduct, even a record-breaking fine may have 
limited deterrent or punitive value.99 The largest privacy fine the FTC has 
ever assessed is $22.5 million, against Google;100 Facebook’s revenue for 
2018 was nearly $56 billion,101 making the likelihood of a fine that will 
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meaningfully change the company’s approach decidedly slim.102 As Chris 
Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius also 
note, no U.S. business has ever failed due to a regulatory fine imposed for 
privacy violations.103 
The Commission has often emphasized its incremental and case-by-
case approach as deliberately laissez-faire, underlining that the agency’s 
goal is to foster innovation as much as it is to protect consumers.104 But 
protecting consumers in a twenty-first century economy where ubiquitous 
commercial surveillance can both harm consumers and have anti-
competitive effects requires an FTC that can prevent new kinds of 
informational harms, not simply react to them.105 It requires an agency 
with enough resources and staff to fulfill its own mission while assisting 
other agencies that require its expertise to fulfill theirs.106 Moreover, 
without significant curbs on their ability to abuse their market power, the 
largest tech companies lack a check on abusive data practices because 
people lack alternatives for the services they provide.107 Limited 
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competition in a market that rewards data collection and offers few 
liabilities for possible resulting harms means that companies have no 
incentive to improve the status quo.108 As it stands, the agency charged 
with facilitating a competitive environment for innovation and protecting 
consumers from exploitation is often unable, and sometimes even 
unwilling,109 to effectively do either. 
D. Narrow Definition of Harm 
A limited definition of what constitutes a privacy “harm” is also 
drawn from the idea of privacy as a good, rather than as a right, and further 
limits the ability of U.S. privacy law to offer comprehensive protections 
for individuals.110 Under that theory, vigorous privacy enforcement does 
more harm than good because individuals should be able to trade away 
their information under nearly all circumstances, and companies should 
not be limited in their ability to coax them into doing so. A related 
corollary holds that informational injuries should be narrowly defined so 
as to include only the most egregious harms, such as physical injury or 
theft.111 Limiting informational harms to physical or financial injuries 
allows more insidious injuries to individuals, such as reputational harms, 
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emotional harms, manipulation, or discrimination to persist. The FTC has 
also relied on a constrained definition of informational harms despite the 
fact that the bread-and-butter of its consumer privacy enforcement work, 
deceptive trade practices, do not require a showing of harm.112 
While the FTC does acknowledge harms beyond the physical and 
financial,113 its limited definition of privacy harms has curtailed its ability 
to protect consumers in the digital age, including by giving officials with 
a more pro-business bent a legalistic reason not to advocate more 
aggressively for consumers.114 The judiciary has created additional 
barriers for individuals looking to vindicate their privacy rights by 
enforcing narrow readings of standing doctrine, such that plaintiffs 
struggle to bring privacy claims even in the rare cases where they are 
afforded the right to do so by statute.115 The Supreme Court has ruled that 
violation of a statute does not constitute per se injury such that the plaintiff 
has standing to sue.116 
An exhaustive list of the kinds of abuses that networked services 
enable and current U.S. privacy law does not forbid would fill a decent-
sized encyclopedia, but a brief list of examples illustrates the range of 
ongoing harms. Facebook conducted a study on how to manipulate the 
mood of its users through its newsfeed without obtaining their consent or 
informing participants that it was happening.117 A 2015 Carnegie Mellon 
study found that Google was more likely to target ads for high-income jobs 
to men than it was to women,118 while a 2013 study found that Google 
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searches for names common in the black community were much more 
likely to have target ads for arrest records databases.119 Uber once threated 
to smear a journalist based on its knowledge of her whereabouts from 
using its app,120 and the New York Times reported that Uber uses 
psychological tricks and gamification to get its drivers to work longer 
hours.121 And a marketing company recently drew angry headlines for 
offering a consumer service that would attempt to influence women 
through targeted advertising to pursue sex with their husbands more 
frequently.122 
While some of these harms might fall into what the FTC would 
consider deceptive conduct, or be forbidden under other laws, the agency’s 
limited resources and narrow definition of harm make it highly unlikely 
that it would take enforcement action against these companies for the 
conduct described. Other misconduct—like Facebook failing to protect 
black users from being disproportionately targeted by Russian 
misinformation operations,123 or Uber attempting to manipulate its 
contractors into working longer hours124—does not cleanly fit under the 
umbrella of a material harm due to deceptive conduct per the agency’s 
definition at all, making it even less likely that an inert agency will 
investigate misconduct it sees as on the edge of its authority. Without 
regulators (or plaintiffs) to hold them accountable, companies continue to 
employ a range of techniques to wheedle their users into playing or 
scrolling longer, sharing more private information, or spending more 
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money,125 while the design of their platforms frequently enables or 
outright incentivizes discrimination, harassment, or extremism.126 
As this Section has briefly illustrated, the weaknesses of U.S. privacy 
law are heavily influenced by a policy approach that seeks to minimize the 
dangers of privacy violations, such that strong consumer protections are 
characterized as a barrier to innovation rather than a necessary safeguard. 
The laissez-faire approach to privacy regulation—and the prioritization of 
corporate flexibility over individual rights—is reflected on a macro scale 
in the choice of sectoral regulation over comprehensive privacy regulation, 
and on the micro scale with the default of most privacy laws allowing data 
collection—as opposed to a default requirement that data collection should 
be justified. The framing of privacy as a good that individuals should be 
able to trade away without limit, the narrow definition of digital harm, the 
inefficacy of notice and choice, and a legally and practically constrained 
FTC keep the law from sufficiently protecting individuals from evolving 
digital threats. 
III. GDPR 
The inspiration for the General Data Protection Regulation stands in 
clear contrast to that of U.S. privacy law: it is a framework that is primarily 
focused on the rights of the data subject and the imperative of protecting 
her, rather than on retroactively correcting whatever collateral damage 
results from facilitating the success of industries built on consumer 
surveillance.127 The law is not a panacea for all digital harms and has been 
subject to critique on a range of issues.128 But the philosophical and legal 
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underpinnings of the GDPR’s balance of competing interests are based on 
a fundamental, constitutional right to privacy and data protection that 
anchors the law in a commitment to individuals first and industry second, 
which does not exist in U.S. privacy law.129 
A. Background on the Regulation 
While the EU conception of privacy as a fundamental right arose 
before World War II, the atrocities to dignity and autonomy committed 
during the war created the impetus for the right to privacy to be formally 
codified in the Declaration of Human Rights,130 the European Convention 
on Human Rights,131 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.132 Following 
the creation of the European Union, the EU Data Protection Directive, a 
precursor to the GDPR, further created the legal framework for a 
streamlined digital single market in the EU with a recognition of the 
fundamental right to privacy created by the ECHR.133 The EU Data 
Protection Directive relies on transposition to implement the goals of the 
Directive—the EU set the overarching objectives, but the member states 
can implement variations of the law’s requirements, provided the domestic 
legislation meets minimum standards.134 The Treaty of Lisbon made the 
right to privacy and the right to data protection constitutional rights 
binding on the member states.135 The connection to human rights law gives 
privacy in the EU an additional measure of gravity that the U.S. framing 
of a “consumer’s” data lacks.136 
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The GDPR takes these commitments one step further. As a 
regulation, rather than a directive, its provisions are directly binding on 
member states, which, as Paul Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer note in 
their insightful article comparing the EU and U.S. privacy regimes, reflects 
the primacy of the data subject in EU privacy law.137 Both EU privacy law 
and the substance of the GDPR reflect this primary commitment to data 
subjects with a comparative disregard for industry prerogatives that would 
make a U.S. industry lobbyist blanch.138 The preamble of the Regulation 
also makes this commitment clear.139 
B. The GDPR’s Protections for Privacy & Data Protection Rights 
The GDPR is not entirely one-sided: it focuses both on the rights of 
individuals, and on simplifying the data protection regime for European 
businesses in a strengthened digital market. However, in both philosophy 
and substance, the law is primarily committed to the rights of individuals 
to control their information.140 To start, the GDPR flips the presumption 
of U.S. privacy law—a data controller must have a legal basis to collect 
data, as opposed to collection being permitted unless it has been 
specifically prohibited.141 The law’s capacious definitions similarly reflect 
a default presumption of protection and a commitment to privacy as a right 
as opposed to a consumer good. Not only does U.S. privacy law 
distinguish privacy from private entities from privacy from the 
government in a way European law does not, the characterization of a 
“consumer” protection focuses on the subject’s use of a good or service.142 
In contrast to the general characterization of a “consumer” right and the 
definition in many U.S. privacy statutes of subjects as “consumers” or 
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data protection law); id. at 969 (describing the European legal conception of control of personal 
information as “a human right of the highest order”); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 123–27 
(describing the history and status of privacy and data protection law in the EU and noting “European 
data protection law is strongly anchored at the constitutional level. Its goal is to protect individuals 
from risks to personhood caused by the processing of personal data, and its favored mode of discourse 
is rights talk. When it discusses privacy, it uses the language of human rights to develop protections 
for its data subjects.”). 
 137. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 129. 
 138. Id. at 129–31 (“Free flow of information matters, but not as much, ultimately, as the 
safeguarding of dignity, privacy, and data protection in the European rights regime.”). 
 139. GDPR, supra note 70, Recital 1, at 1 (“The protection of natural persons in relation to the 
processing of personal data is a fundamental right.”). 
 140. Id. art. 1(2), at 32 (“This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.”). 
 141. Id. art. 6, at 36. 
 142. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 132 nn.106–07 and accompanying text. 
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“subscribers,” the GDPR generally applies to data subjects regardless of 
whether any kind of transaction has taken place, with a few exceptions.143 
The GDPR prioritizes ensuring that data collection adheres to the 
subjects’ expectations and that they have control over their information 
rather than focusing on how onerous establishing the basis for lawful 
processing may be.144 Much has been made, for example, of the GDPR’s 
requirements for obtaining consent, and how those might inhibit business 
practices.145 The GDPR places a much higher bar for what constitutes 
consent, acknowledging that check-the-box clickwrap hardly ever 
constitutes meaningful decision-making. Controllers need consent for the 
“[p]rocessing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, 
and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of 
uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data 
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited.”146 Consent must be freely given, specific and informed, 
subjects must be able to withdraw it, and receipt of a service must not be 
conditioned on providing it.147 Preventing companies from relying on 
vague privacy policies which consumers must accept in order to use the 
product is a key part of giving individuals any kind of meaningful rights 
over their information, as well as an important element of correcting the 
inadequacies of notice and choice described above.148 
The law also sets broad parameters for the definitions of key terms, 
such as what constitutes “personal data” and “processing.” Personal data 
is “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’),” while “an identifiable natural person” is defined as “one 
who can be identified . . . in particular by reference to an identifier such as 
a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to 
one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.”149 
                                                     
 143. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 3(2), at 33 (“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal 
data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union, 
where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of 
whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the 
monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 144. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 131 (“In this regime, economic interest in 
information and benefits on the ‘supply side’ regarding technology are not particularly important.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Sohin Gautam, 21st Century Problems: Will the European Union Data Reform 
Properly Balance Its Citizens’ Business Interests and Privacy Rights?, 21 SW. J. INT’L L. 195 (2014). 
 146. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 9(1), at 38. 
 147. Id. art. 7, at 37. 
 148. See supra Part I. 
 149. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 4(1), at 33. 
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“Processing” is defined as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by 
automated means.”150 The end result is that the majority of data is personal 
data, or is capable of becoming it, and nearly anything done with data is 
considered to be “processing,” though the law exempts “purely personal 
or household activity” as well as national security.151 In a similar reflection 
of how the definitions of the law are primarily concerned with the rights 
of individuals rather than the compliance obligations of businesses, 
requirements are not calibrated to the size of the business, as small 
businesses that handle sensitive data still have the potential to abuse it.152 
The GDPR’s jurisdiction is similarly broad.153 
The law further reflects a normative commitment to enshrining 
meaningful rights to privacy and data protection for individuals by 
codifying proactive access, correction, and objection rights. The GDPR 
gives individuals the right to know whether their information is being 
processed, to receive information about the processing, and to be provided 
with a copy of what has been processed.154 Individuals also have a right to 
data portability and to rectify inaccuracies in the information controllers 
collect about them.155 Other rights include the right to restrict processing, 
the right to object to processing taking place, and the right to erasure, also 
known as “the right to be forgotten.”156 The GDPR also recognizes the 
modern concerns of automated decision-makingfully automated 
profiling that can “produce legal effects or significantly affect” the subject 
is prohibited157 unless there is a contract between subject and controller, 
and the processing is either authorized by law with suitable safeguard or 
based on the subject’s consent.158 Some of these rights are represented in 
U.S. law, many are not, and they are limited to the sector-specific statute 
                                                     
 150. Id. art. 4(2), at 33. 
 151. Id. art. 2(2)(c), at 32; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 75. 
 152. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 73. 
 153. The GDPR applies to any entity that processes personal data “in the context of the activities 
of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union”—regardless of whether or not the 
processing occurs on EU soil—and to any entity that processes the data of EU subjects in order to 
offer them goods and services or to monitor their behavior. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 3(1)–(2), at 32–
33. 
 154. Id. art. 15, at 43. 
 155. Id. art. 16, at 43; id. Recital 68, at 13. 
 156. Id. art. 17, at 43–44. 
 157. Id. art. 22(1), at 46; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 90 n.212 and accompanying 
texts (discussing scholarly interpretation of the relevant provision). 
 158. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 22(2), at 46. 
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rather than broadly applicable to nearly all processed information.159 
Others, like the right to data portability, are new.160 
In addition to the substantive prohibitions and requirements the 
GDPR enacted to strengthen individual privacy rights, it also created a 
substantial enforcement regime to ensure its protections and prohibitions 
are a meaningful check on industry conduct. Violations of certain rules 
can trigger fines of up to 2% of global turnover, while more egregious 
violations can trigger fines of up to 4%.161 The ability of individuals to 
receive judicial redress for violations also gives the GDPR teeth that U.S. 
privacy laws frequently lack, given that many U.S. privacy laws lack a 
private right of action. Even the laws that do have a private right of action 
still face a narrow approach to standing doctrine that often keeps privacy 
plaintiffs out of court, due to a limited definition of what constitutes 
“injury.”162 Under the GDPR, individuals can file complaints with Data 
Protection Authorities (DPAs), just as they can file them with the FTC in 
the United States, but the GDPR also provides an explicit right to an 
effective judicial remedy for data subjects, as well as creating a collective 
action mechanism.163 Unlike the FTC, DPAs are also required to hear the 
complaints individuals file with them.164  
Ultimately, the GDPR is a vast improvement on the Pollockian 
splattering of half-hearted statutes that protect privacy in the United States. 
It creates substantive rights to protect individuals from privacy invasions 
and the harms that can result from opaque automated processing. It also 
creates a significant enforcement regime to give those rights meaning and 
incentivizes compliance. But in addition to a basis in an almost 
diametrically opposed legal and political tradition,165 the GDPR’s 
commitment to individual privacy is supported by a comprehensive 
constitutional right to privacy and data protection that does not exist in 
U.S. law. An approach that bridges the gap between the U.S. laissez-faire 
approach to privacy regulation, and the prescriptive, rights-based 
European approach, can coalesce with the U.S. model while emulating the 
                                                     
 159. COPPA, for example, affords parents the right to request that their children’s data be 
deleted, and requires service providers to notify parents of that right. 16 C.F.R. § 312.4 (2018). 
 160. GDPR, supra note 80, Recital 68, at 13; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 89. 
 161. Id. art. 83(4)–(5), at 82–83. 
 162. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 94. 
 163. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 80(1), at 81. 
 164. Id. art. 57(1)(f), at 68. 
 165. See generally Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 72 (“[T]he GDPR has a dual goal of 
promoting the free flow of personal data within the EU (to help businesses), and protecting people and 
their personal data. Yet, the GDPR emphasizes the latter goal.”); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 
131 (“Data protection law does not concern itself greatly with how its protection of the data subject 
might negatively impact useful activities of data processors.”). 
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GDPR’s commitment to individual rights—and perhaps even provide 
additional protections. 
IV. APPLYING FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO DATA COLLECTORS 
As this Article has attempted to illustrate, the philosophies and legal 
traditions behind the U.S. and European approaches to privacy regulation 
are distinct. The constitutional right to privacy and data protection in the 
EU places a high premium on how privacy is understood in policy 
discussions, and unsurprisingly, the GDPR is animated by an 
appropriately lofty commitment to meaningful protections for individuals 
that will actually be enforced. In contrast, the U.S. understanding of 
privacy as a good rather than a right minimizes the normative value of 
protections for it, while the increasingly narrow legal recourses for 
enforcing the few rights that do exist heavily limit their efficacy. Against 
this backdrop, an information fiduciary framework can strike the 
necessary balance of competing objectives: it is designed to balance 
commercial prerogatives with meaningful protections for individuals in 
the way that U.S. privacy law attempts, yet fails, to do. Moreover, the 
framing of data collectors owing affirmative duties to individuals injects a 
moral valence that the U.S. emphasis on privacy as a good otherwise 
eschews, as well as creating a presumption of obligations owed to 
individuals that does not currently exist. 
Like traditional fiduciaries, companies that collect enormous 
amounts of data on individuals have a strategic advantage over their clients 
due to the fact that they are trusted with the user’s sensitive information, 
in addition to superior and specialized knowledge, lack of transparency, 
and the reliance of their users on the specialized services provided.166 
Given a highly consolidated market and the low risk that enforcement 
poses to profitability, companies have every incentive in the world to 
                                                     
 166. See generally Lindsey Barrett, Model(ing) Privacy: Empirical Approaches to Privacy Law 
and Governance, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 17–20 (2018) (describing the informational 
asymmetry between data collectors and the people relying on them for products and services, as well 
as the inability of individual users to understand or monitor their conduct due to structural challenges 
like lack of transparency); Lina Khan, Sources of Tech Platform Power, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 325, 
329 (2018) (discussing the power tech companies hold, including “information exploitation” of their 
users in discriminatory or privacy-invasive ways); Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against 
Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1186 (2017) (discussing the power 
of networked platforms to deliberately discriminate or unintentionally facilitate discrimination against 
its users); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival 
of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1669 (2018) (describing the “unique kind 
of platform power” companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Uber hold over the users, 
employees, and third parties that rely on their services). 
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leverage that asymmetry in their favor, and often do.167 The ways that data 
collectors can take advantage of their subjects extends far beyond lying 
about data collection and use, and the harms extend beyond what privacy 
law generally protects, such as manipulation and discrimination.168 
Individuals deserve meaningful protections against violations of their 
privacy, and against the manipulation, exploitation, discrimination, and 
other harms that digital platforms are uniquely positioned to directly 
perpetrate or indirectly enable. A duty not to discriminate or manipulate 
also speaks to objectives similar to the GDPR’s ban on fully automated 
decision-making based on profiling, given the risks to dignity and 
autonomy of reducing people to a series of opaque, and often biased, 
statistical evaluations.169 
Crucially, applying fiduciary duties to data collectors would raise the 
bar of how digital companies are expected to treat their users’ information. 
It would help adjust the objective of U.S. privacy law to more heavily 
prioritize the rights of the user, while still accounting for the commercial 
prerogatives of the collector. Fiduciary duties for doctors and lawyers have 
always recognized that legitimate professional objectives can coexist with 
the client’s need for certain rights to be respected—a balance that can be 
wrought in the digital context as well. Duties of loyalty, care, and 
confidentiality can also prohibit digital harms such as manipulation, 
discrimination, and other harms that laws exclusively focused on privacy 
are ill-equipped to prevent, while still permitting non-harmful commercial 
activity. 
The following Sections will describe what form an information 
fiduciary framework could take, and what it would need to incorporate in 
order to provide meaningful protections and change existing incentives for 
data collectors. They address why it is necessary for a fiduciary status to 
be compulsory, the importance of distinguishing between traditional and 
information fiduciaries, and what the duties of loyalty, care, and 
confidentiality could entail, including how those duties could expand the 
definitions of digital harm, and provide the basis for less trivial 
enforcement. Finally, they will address how an information fiduciary 
                                                     
 167. See BALKIN, supra note 26, at 2–3 (noting the economic incentives of social media 
companies to promote engaging content “even if it is polarizing, false, or demagogic” and the capacity 
of bad actors to take advantage of that dynamic); id. at 4 (noting the economic incentives of social 
media companies to manipulate their users and to allow other to do it); Khan, supra note 166, at 325–
28 (discussing the gatekeeper and leverage power of online platforms against their competitors). 
 168. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 450–51 (describing how information disclosure 
creates vulnerabilities that data collectors can leverage in their benefit and to their users’ detriment). 
 169. INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, GUIDE TO THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTING REGULATION 149 
(Aug. 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulati 
on-gdpr-1-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YWJ-YZJZ]. 
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framework should approach both direct harms and negligent ones enabled 
by the design of the platform, or through lax enforcement of its policies. 
A. Distinguishing Traditional Fiduciaries 
As Balkin and Zittrain have noted, fiduciary duties for data collectors 
must be tailored to the context they are being created for, and both have 
argued that the expectations of good faith and fair dealing for information 
fiduciaries should be lower than what is expected of traditional 
fiduciaries.170 Traditional fiduciaries are generally prohibited from 
benefitting from their clients’ information in a way that could hurt the 
client: using client information to enrich themselves in a way that 
disadvantages the client would violate the duty of loyalty, and sharing it 
beyond prescribed limits would violate the duty of confidentiality.171 Yet 
for certain business models, like social media companies or data brokers, 
profiting from their users’ information seems like the very foundation of 
the product data collectors provide. Certainly, any application of fiduciary 
duties to data collectors would need to distinguish the kinds of conduct 
that are inherent to the service—such as a search engine “discriminating” 
by sorting through information and only providing the responsive 
results—from disloyal conduct designed to benefit the data collector to the 
detriment of the subject.172 And as with traditional fiduciaries, the extent 
of the duty should also correspond to the degree of power imbalance, as 
Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog argue, as should the severity of the 
punishment for violating it.173 
Granted, the degree of trust that users place in a cloud service or a 
social media platform is often different from the trust they place in a doctor 
or a lawyer, as the services and vulnerabilities are different.174 But the 
information such a company holds can be no less sensitive by virtue of 
seeming more banal. Providing your location so that an Uber can take you 
to a bar is a transaction of much more limited scope and gravity than telling 
your lawyer incriminating details she intends to use for your defense. The 
balance shifts when you take an Uber to a more sensitive location, such as 
a protest site, an abortion clinic, or a temple, or when the information is 
used in aggregate to piece together your movements over a period of time, 
                                                     
 170. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162; see also Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 16. 
 171. See BALKIN, supra note 26, at 15. 
 172. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 470 (distinguishing the relationship of a data 
collector and subject from a traditional fiduciary and the client). 
 173. Id. at 458; Frankel, supra note 12, at 825. 
 174. Frankel, supra note 12, at 825 (“These rules vary with the extent of the entrustor's 
vulnerability to abuse.”); id. at 832 (“[T]he degree of moral culpability of the fiduciary is positively 
related to the extent of the entrustor’s helplessness.”). 
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or to be turned over to law enforcement.175 The balance is shifted even 
further after considering that any information that Uber stores could be 
used by the company to enrich itself at your expense or to shut out 
competitors, be breached by a hacker, accessed by law enforcement, or 
used to blackmail you. 
A key distinction between the expectations attached to traditional 
fiduciaries and how data collectors have been permitted to function is the 
presumption of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the absence 
of specific proscriptions.176 There is a space between the loyalty and good 
faith one reasonably expects from a doctor or lawyer, and what one expects 
from the various companies that provide digital products and services. But 
that space exists because of the legal vacuum that has allowed data 
collectors to invade, exploit, and manipulate with impunity, not because 
the vulnerability of their users will always be smaller than that of a 
doctor’s patients, or because a lawyer’s ability to abuse her power over her 
clients is always greater than the power tech platforms wield over their 
users. Information fiduciary duties must be created with an eye for context, 
but not the flat assumption that the power dynamic between an individual 
and an online banking provider, an ISP, a picture storage service, a dating 
platform, or any other digital intermediary lacks the kind of moral valence 
that classic fiduciary relationships have been deemed to have, or the same 
potential for abuse of power. 
It is also worth emphasizing that while the contexts in which different 
professions have developed fiduciary principles are distinct, that does not 
render a fiduciary approach inapposite for data collectors. The principles 
behind conflicts of interest rules in medicine or law are not so morally 
lofty and restrictive that they are inherently inapplicable to the context of 
data collectors—quite the opposite.177 The ethical codes governing doctors 
and lawyers both provide leeway for conduct that does not entirely 
subordinate the fiduciary’s interest to the client’s when the two conflict.178 
                                                     
 175. See generally RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
CELLPHONES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 2–3 (2018), https://www. 
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018_12_CellSurveillanceV3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HJD6-UMLG] (discussing the collection of cellphone location data and law enforcement use of it); 
Tonya Riley, Civil Rights Groups Aren’t Impressed by Facebook’s Efforts to Fight Discrimination, 
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/12/facebook-civil-righ 
ts-audit-color-of-change-russian-disinformation-african-americans/ [https://perma.cc/6X7P-ZUGM]. 
 176. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162.  
 177. See generally Forell & Sortun, supra note 37 (criticizing the insufficiency of existing 
methods of regulating the conduct of doctors and lawyers and arguing for a tort based on betrayal by 
fiduciaries in those professions). 
 178. A striking example of this is the medical tradition of allowing medical students to perform 
pelvic exams on unconscious female patients for the sake of the students’ education, when the patients 
have not been informed that the exam would take place. Phoebe Friesen, Why Are Pelvic Exams on 
Unconscious, Unconsenting Women Still Part of Medical Training?, SLATE (Oct. 30, 2018), https:// 
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In their thorough and thoughtful critique of the information fiduciary 
model, Lina Khan and David Pozen argue that any business model that 
relies on behavioral advertising is antithetical with a requirement that the 
fiduciary place the client’s interests above her own, underlining the point 
with a hypothetical “Dr. Marta Zuckerberg” who derives her income from 
“enabling third parties to market [her patients] goods and services.”179 Yet 
the pharmaceutical industry’s influence on prescribing practices make this 
hypothetical very real, as do the conflicting incentives of doctors with a 
financial stake in the medical devices they recommend.180 One need not 
imagine a hypothetical Dr. Zuckerberg who derives income from 
recommending products to patients when lawsuits and reporting have 
clearly demonstrated the role that Purdue Pharma’s sales tactics have 
played in creating the opioid crisis.181 The ethical rules governing conflicts 
of interest for lawyers are also far from iron-clad. Lawyers are prohibited 
from using their client’s information to disadvantage the client—but may 
do so if the client provides informed consent.182 There is certainly a range 
of critiques that can be leveled against how existing fiduciary rules 
accommodate conflicted conduct, but these fields are hardly strangers to 
the kind of inherent conflicts implicated by data collection.183 Fiduciary 
rules are flexible to professional prerogatives, but they are not toothless, 
and they implicate a moral dimension to the regulation of commercial 
conduct that other consumer protection regulation does not automatically 
                                                     
slate.com/technology/2018/10/pelvic-exams-unconscious-women-medical-training-consent.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/L4WT-QGS3] (citing Stephanie Schniederjan & G. Kevin Donovan, Ethics Versus 
Education: Pelvic Exams on Anesthetized Women, 98 J. OKLA. ST. MED. ASS’N 386 (2005)). 
 179. Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 13) (on file with Harvard Law Review). 
 180. Forell & Sortun, supra note 37, at 559 (describing the conflicts of interest created by the 
pharmaceutical industry and the lack of legal ramifications); Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can 
Learn from Lawyers About Conflicts of Interest, 81 B.U. L. REV. 445, 455 (2001) (discussing the 
conflict of interest in doctors receiving monetary incentives for enrolling their patients in clinical 
trials). 
 181. Michael Forsythe & Walt Bogdanich, McKinsey Advised Purdue Pharma How to 
‘Turbocharge’ Opiod Sales, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/201 
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(“McKinsey also recommended that Purdue redirect its sales force to focus on doctors who were 
especially prolific prescribers of OxyContin, according to the suit. One slide made public by the 
attorney general’s office, attributed to McKinsey, focused on one doctor in the town of Wareham, 
Mass., who almost doubled his annual output of OxyContin prescriptions after a big increase in visits 
from Purdue sales representatives.”); Barry Meier, Sacklers Directed Efforts to Mislead Public About 
OxyContin, Court Filing Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/ 
health/sacklers-purdue-oxycontin-opioids.html [https://perma.cc/C2FB-MLMJ] (describing the 
Massachusetts lawsuit claiming that Purdue “aggressively” promoted the drug to doctors who were 
big opioid prescribers).  
 182. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 1.8 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).  
 183. Contra Khan & Pozen, supra note 179, at 13. 
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invoke, and which much of the U.S. discourse around privacy as a good 
attempts to repudiate.  
Ultimately, the fact that the business models of many tech companies 
seem to be predicated on exploitation of their users simply demonstrates 
the aspects of those businesses that an information fiduciary framework 
would prohibit, not that an information fiduciary framework is logically 
incoherent. Exploitation of users’ information should not be required for 
digital products and services to function, and for most of them, it is not. A 
social network need not be inherently manipulative, discriminatory, or 
privacy-invasive—the same is true for an internet service provider, a 
rideshare company, a medical device company, or a cloud service. A 
media company can rely on subscriptions;184 a search engine can rely on 
contextual advertising.185 To the extent that behavioral advertising or 
renting out user information to third parties undermines a duty of loyalty, 
that does not mean that a fiduciary model cannot be applied to data 
collectors; it means that exploitative practices will be prohibited, and non-
exploitative services and products will not be.  
B. Compulsory Fiduciary Duties 
In order to be effective, any attempt to characterize data collectors as 
information fiduciaries must be compulsory rather than optional. Both 
Balkin and Zittrain suggest that a fiduciary framework could be opt-in, 
with a law that would preempt state privacy laws for the companies that 
choose to join.186 This approach would certainly bolster the political 
feasibility of any fiduciary proposal, and the looming deadline of a new 
privacy law in California has made tech companies claim to be more 
amenable towards a new comprehensive, federal privacy law than they 
                                                     
 184. Jenny Luna, Why Every Business Will Soon Be a Subscription Business, STAN. BUS.: 
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 186. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 15; Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 16; Zittrain, supra note 15, at 
340. 
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have been in the past.187 But a voluntary regime shaped by the lobbyists 
for the companies it would purport to regulate will be subject to the same 
broad provisions and tepid commitments of other self-regulatory programs 
that have been largely ineffective.188 The result is a catch-22—either the 
new federal law is too weak to be impactful in order to coax companies to 
join the safe harbor, or the law creates meaningful protections and 
enforcement, and the companies have no reason to join.189 
While an opt-in regime seems temptingly seamless, I share the 
skepticism that Lina Kahn and David Pozen express in their appropriately 
titled essay that it could produce the kind of meaningful change the digital 
ecosystem so desperately needs.190 Rather than a significant realignment 
in incentives and philosophy, the result will be additional lip service by 
some companies to privacy (and ammunition against further enforcement 
or regulation), no change from others, and little impact on the status quo 
for individuals.191 The U.S. privacy landscape is far too skewed towards 
corporate priorities for a program industry-friendly enough to tempt 
voluntary compliance to be capable of restoring the equilibrium. For a 
fiduciary framework to have real force, it must apply compulsory duties 
for information fiduciaries, and provide for real enforcement when those 
duties are violated. 
                                                     
 187. Kang, supra note 9 (describing the lobbying efforts of Facebook, IBM, Microsoft and other 
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C. Information Fiduciary Duties: Loyalty, Care, Confidentiality 
Generally, any information fiduciary framework should require 
duties of loyalty, care, and confidentiality, though there is a range of what 
specific obligations those duties could entail. Balkin argues for duties of 
care, loyalty, and confidentiality,192 characterizing the primary obligation 
of the information fiduciaries as not acting like a “con artist” by inducing 
trust in their users to obtain their information, then using that information 
to the benefit of the fiduciary and the detriment of the user, in violation of 
that trust.193 As an example, fiduciaries should be prohibited from 
“hold[ing] themselves out as providing digital safety and respecting digital 
privacy and then manipulat[ing] and discriminat[ing] against their end-
users,” and prohibited from sharing or selling data from or about their 
users to entities not subject to its fiduciary duties.194 Zittrain focuses on 
the political dimensions of manipulation, stating that “a central 
responsibility of an information intermediary would be to serve up others’ 
data in ways not designed to further the political goals of the 
intermediary.”195 The Data Care Act, a comprehensive legislative 
framework recently proposed by Senator Brian Schatz and fourteen other 
senators, sketches out broad duties of loyalty, care, and confidentiality, 
while providing the FTC with rulemaking authority to determine the 
details.196 In a relevant and cogent article advocating for the role of trust 
in privacy law, Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog discuss the value of 
incorporating duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and care into privacy law, 
though they do not argue for a scheme of compulsory fiduciary duties per 
se.197 
Ariel Dobkin proposes a more granular framework, arguing that 
informational fiduciary duties should be divided into four categories of 
behavior: manipulation, discrimination, sharing with third parties without 
consent, and violations of a company’s privacy policy.198 A duty is 
violated when the fiduciary exceeds a reasonable user’s expectations, 
which those types of conduct will generally do.199 These four types of 
conduct are more specific elaborations of the broader fiduciary duties—
duties of confidentiality and loyalty would likely cover violations of the 
company’s privacy policy, for example. Dobkin’s discussion of duties not 
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to discriminate or manipulate also demonstrates how fiduciary duties 
would protect against not just privacy harms, but a broader definition of 
digital injuries, as does Balkin’s inclusion of manipulation and 
discrimination from the kinds of harms his framework would prohibit, and 
Zittrain’s description of “digital gerrymandering.”200 These proposals 
reflect the range of what an information fiduciary framework could 
incorporate in terms of scope, ambition, and stringency. 
D. Expand the Definition of Digital Harm, and Who Can Be  
Held Responsible for It 
The proposals discussed above offer a variety of approaches to direct 
and negligent harms, and the types of digital harms that information 
fiduciary duties would prohibit. In order to effectively guard against the 
full gamut of digital harms not covered by existing law, an information 
fiduciary framework must expand the notion of digital harm beyond 
unauthorized disclosure of information, and physical and monetary 
harms—indeed, beyond privacy. In addition, the architecture of the online 
ecosystem requires an approach to fiduciary duties that does not focus on 
direct conduct alone: fiduciaries should also not be permitted to enable the 
manipulation, discrimination, or privacy violations of users stemming 
from unreasonably lax enforcement of their own policies, or design 
choices that enable those harms. The following Sections will address how 
fiduciary duties could incorporate a more expansive definition of privacy 
harms, including a broader definition of digital harms more generally, such 
as discrimination and manipulation, and how fiduciaries could be applied 
to address the problem of diffuse responsibility. 
1. Diffuse Responsibility 
For an information fiduciary framework to be effective, it will need 
to respond to the way large platforms, smaller players, and third-party 
services create a tangled web of interactions resulting in direct and indirect 
harms to users. In addition, the negligence of internet platforms in policing 
the spaces they provide for misconduct has led to a slew of problems, and 
an effective information fiduciary framework must tackle not only the 
direct actions of data collectors, but also the harms that passivity can 
perpetuate. Architectural choices that facilitate user harms and failure to 
enforce a service’s policies often overlap, and the result is platforms that 
facilitate harassment, manipulation, and discrimination, thanks to a 
negligent failure to see how products built for good can easily be used for 
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evil, along with a healthy dose of monetary self-interest.201 For a few 
examples, Twitter’s lax enforcement and opaque policies concerning 
harassment have led women, activists, and other targeted groups to leave 
the site rather than endure the abuse202—or continue to endure the slurs 
and death threats at great effort, cost, and risk to their personal safety.203 
Design choices on Airbnb led to widespread problems of bias on that 
platform.204 And Facebook’s failure to devote sufficient resources to 
content moderation in Myanmar contributed to a violent genocide.205 
Platforms turning a blind eye as third parties violate their policies or 
otherwise hurt users is a big part of how companies may indirectly 
perpetuate harms. Certainly, lax enforcement makes perfect sense in an 
environment where platforms want as many users as possible, as many app 
purchases as possible, and as many ad clicks as possible.206 Established 
companies want to entrench their dominant positions, while up-and-
comers want to join their ranks or establish metrics to secure the next 
round of funding. Problems like a recommendation algorithm that suggests 
ever more extreme content207 or accounts that create high levels of 
engagement through harassing other users pose a collateral risk while 
contributing to tech companies’ bottom lines.208 Meanwhile, tech 
companies promise to do better, but fail to make meaningful changes 
because the status quo is more profitable. A fiduciary framework should 
consider how companies can make their services and products safely 
usable by everyone, not just those with the wherewithal to survive the 
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inevitable toxicity, particularly when the harms may not be fully avoidable 
by anyone. 
As implemented in a fiduciary framework, a prohibition on 
negligently creating or incentivizing a dangerous environment would 
likely come under the duties of care or loyalty. The Data Care Act defines 
the duty of loyalty as prohibiting fiduciaries from using “individual 
identifying data or data derived from individual identifying data” in a way 
that would “benefit [the fiduciary] to the detriment of the end user” if it 
would “result in reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial 
harm to an end user” or “be unexpected and highly offensive to a 
reasonable end user,”209 one or the other. That definition of harm is fairly 
narrow, and should not be limited to physical or financial injuries. 
Dignitary and other harms that are not necessarily physical or financial 
could also be “unexpected and highly offensive to the reasonable person,” 
but given the difficulty of accurately gauging digital mores—and how high 
the threshold of “highly offensive” could be set—the bill’s definition of 
harm should be more capacious. 
2. Privacy Harms 
In addition to expanding the notion of legally cognizable digital 
harms, an effective information fiduciary framework should expand the 
definition of what a privacy harm is. It should also strengthen existing 
protections, such as more meaningful obligations to enact reasonable 
security protocols, and stricter requirements to notify users in the case of 
breach. These objectives could be met by a combination of the duties of 
care, loyalty, and confidentiality. A data breach resulting from 
unauthorized access to a poorly secured system is one harm that would 
likely be both squarely prohibited by fiduciary duties and firmly within 
what U.S. privacy law already prohibits.210 The duty of care under the Data 
Care Act, for example, is primarily focused on a federal standard (and 
different application) of securing data and breach notifications, which are 
already covered by a range of laws.211 Richards and Hartzog argue that the 
duty of confidentiality could be parsed into different levels of obligation 
in order to better tailor the traditional duty for the data collector context, 
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which they divide into “nondisclosure, limited disclosure, trustworthy 
recipients, and obfuscation to be discreet.”212 
Additionally, an effective information fiduciary framework should 
not make the definition of a privacy harm contingent on physical or 
monetary injury. While the FTC’s efficacy has been limited by a lack of 
civil penalty authority and a greater need for resources, it is also hamstrung 
by a limited approach to defining informational harm, despite the fact that 
many digital harms do not involve financial loss or necessarily involve an 
imminent risk to physical safety.213 In other cases, with an FTC more 
inclined to protect industry over consumers, a narrow definition of 
informational injury simply provides an excuse for anemic enforcement.214 
Expanding the definition of what constitutes a privacy harm to more 
broadly include non-financial injuries is particularly crucial as so many 
digital products and services do not require users to pay for the service.215 
Provided the definition was not unnecessarily cabined to financial or 
physical harm,216 a duty of confidentiality would extend to privacy 
invasions that the FTC has appeared to not consider within its purview 
because of its narrow interpretation of informational injury. 
The GDPR provides a broad definition for cognizable injury, as any 
data subject has “the right to an effective judicial remedy where he or she 
considers that his or her rights . . . have been infringed” as the result of 
processing, or as the result of a company not complying with the law,217 
and violating any of the GDPR’s many requirements for providers and 
specific rights for consumers could constitute grounds for a hefty fine.218 
A fiduciary framework would likely not expand the basis for a cognizable 
privacy harm quite that far, and would be somewhat limited by courts’ 
application of Spokeo.219 
The duty of care, confidentiality, or loyalty would prohibit many of 
the invasive practices permitted under current law, or which go 
unpunished by an under-resourced, or simply inert, FTC. A key change to 
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privacy enforcement would be the current challenge of relying on 
deception to effectively regulate privacy, which can leave no legal 
recourse for victims simply because a company informed them (in fine 
print, of course) that it could invade their privacy.220 As duties of care, 
loyalty, and confidentiality would protect users regardless of whatever fine 
print obfuscation companies use to attempt to trick them, a fiduciary 
framework could actually improve upon the GDPR’s attempts to fix notice 
and choice.221 
Fundamentally, a higher legal obligation to users would help shift the 
default attitude of data collectors from “collect everything and ask 
questions later,” as would holding the service provider responsible for 
enabling privacy invasions by third parties. As both Balkin and the Data 
Care Act propose, fiduciaries should be required to contractually obligate 
any third parties they share data with to uphold the fiduciary duties they 
owe their users.222 As Balkin puts it, “fiduciary obligations must run with 
the data.”223 As one small example, Facebook reportedly shared user 
information with so many third parties that many were unaware that they 
even had access to so much information.224 Affirmative legal duties to 
users, like a prohibition on sharing their information except with entities 
required to uphold the fiduciary’s same duties, would vastly limit 
incentives to share information as recklessly as companies like Facebook 
have. Companies that serve as a data hose to other services—Google, 
Facebook, data brokers, and other entities—would also bear a 
responsibility to the individuals whose data they are sharing that it would 
not be used to their detriment. This resembles the GDPR’s holding data 
collectors responsible for the actions of the entities it contracts with,225 as 
well as the law’s disfavoring of third-party data sharing.226A broader 
definition of privacy harms and a shift in the default assumption that a 
company owes duties to its users, as opposed to a default that they do not, 
would be a key shift in the balance of power between individuals and the 
companies taking advantage of them. 
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3. Beyond Privacy Harms: Manipulation & Discrimination 
In addition to expanding the kinds of legally cognizable privacy 
harms, an information fiduciary framework should also address 
manipulation and discrimination in order to ensure that people are 
protected from the full array of modern digital threats that they face. While 
defining manipulation can be fraught, certain attributes can be combined 
to a definition that the law should prohibit without being severely over-
inclusive. Building on Ryan Calo’s work on digital manipulation, Ido 
Kilovaty argues that the kind of manipulation that should be subject to 
legal limitations is hidden from the subject, exploits the subject’s 
vulnerabilities, is targeted to her with the objective of changing her 
behavior or outlook, and warrants intervention when the manipulator is 
leveraging her divergent interests over the subject.227 Dobkin highlights 
two definitions of problematic manipulation: conduct that ignores the 
dignity or autonomy of the subject and conduct that subverts the welfare 
of the user to the welfare of the data collector when their interests 
diverge.228 Balkin provides yet another definition, characterizing 
manipulation as “techniques of persuasion and influence that (1) prey on 
another person’s emotional vulnerabilities and lack of knowledge (2) to 
benefit oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the welfare of the other 
person.”229 As Balkin and others argue, while manipulation is hardly new 
as a commercial concept, digital companies have the ability and incentive 
to manipulate their users in a particularly dangerous and impactful way.230 
These definitions all contribute important facets to what a definition 
of manipulation should include. I would argue that persuasive tactics 
targeted to the user, designed to exploit her vulnerability and intended to 
change her conduct or outlook when the interests of the subject and the 
provider diverge, should constitute manipulation and violate the duty of 
loyalty. Manipulation that preys on normative values like autonomy, 
equality, and dignity could exacerbate the egregiousness of the violation, 
as would manipulation based on a protected group status or activity. 
Manipulation for ideological purposes, commercial purposes, or both 
would violate the duty. Given the diffuse nature of networked products 
and services, hosting a platform or service that facilitates manipulation by 
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other users or by third parties could sometimes violate the duty of loyalty, 
and should generally violate the duty of care.   
As an example, an entity that purports to provide a “neutral” product 
or service but quietly subjects users to a deliberate ideological campaign 
would be engaging in manipulation that should violate the duty of loyalty. 
Pushing an ideological agenda with the objective of changing the user’s 
perception of an issue or shaping their actions is the company placing its 
welfare above that of its users, based on the user’s lack of awareness of 
the service’s ultimate objective. As an example, Dobkin describes the 
hypothetical of Walmart promoting an anti-abortion agenda by 
configuring its website to direct ads featuring “adorable babies” if the user 
searches for “birth control,” and says that scenario would not violate her 
principle of anti-manipulation if the company was subjecting all users to 
those tactics rather than some.231 That framing conflates manipulation with 
discrimination, and the latter should not have to exist for the former to be 
found. Moreover, targeting can be implicit: Walmart can easily bank on 
the assumption that women of child-bearing age seeking information 
about contraception are a sizeable proportion, if not the majority, of the 
users searching its site for “birth control.” Deliberate, obfuscated 
ideological skewing of a purported neutral service should be considered 
manipulation of the user and a violation of the duty of loyalty.232 
Companies should not be able to surreptitiously subject their users to 
campaigns of ideological manipulation, and individuals should be able to 
hold them legally responsible if they do. 
Distinguishing manipulation that exploits vulnerabilities and is based 
on subverting the user’s interests to the company’s divergent ones still 
allows companies to conduct legitimate forms of persuasion—generally 
speaking, non-exploitative advertising, or product architecture that does 
not seek to exploit users’ vulnerabilities for the company’s benefit. An 
advertiser, or the operator of the site hosting the ad, should not be able to 
target a user with ads for casinos based on her searches for the nearest 
Gamblers Anonymous meeting. This surreptitiously exploits a 
vulnerability of the user to the advertiser’s benefit and the user’s 
detriment. But a company could, for example, target a user on a contextual 
basis by sending her an ad for Gatorade, a sports drink, because she is 
reading an article on how to avoid dehydration in sports, or streaming a 
sporting event. This attempt to persuade the user for the company’s gain—
either the publisher or the advertiser—did not exploit the user’s 
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vulnerability or surreptitiously perform one function while insidiously 
accomplishing another to the company’s benefit and her detriment.233 
As discussed above, a data collector can attempt to manipulate users 
directly, or it can enable or facilitate manipulation by third parties, and an 
effective fiduciary framework would address both. Information fiduciaries 
enabling manipulation by third parties, such as through search results that 
prioritize misinformation, could violate the duty of loyalty or care. For 
example, reporting by April Glaser echoed a version of Dobkin’s 
hypothetical when she demonstrated that YouTube consistently surfaces 
search results for “abortion” that reflect anti-abortion disinformation.234 
Unlike Dobkin’s hypothetical, the ideological skew of the abortion results 
on YouTube is due to the content uploaded by users of that platform, the 
architecture of how its algorithm rewards engaging content,235 and lack of 
enforcement,236 rather than the result of an ideological agenda being 
pushed by YouTube itself. But as noted above, this kind of negligence can 
still have dangerous effects if users take the disinformation at face value,237 
and in certain cases, it may be appropriate to hold platforms responsible 
for patterns of reckless disregard for how third parties are manipulating 
the platform. Disinformation about vaccinations fits a similar profile of 
potential harm created by a platform that fails to crack down on 
misinformation and users who do not realize the information they are 
being provided is false.238 
Another example of an ideologically manipulative practice would be 
attempting to surreptitiously influence users regarding whom they should 
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vote for,239 or allowing third parties to do that.240 The first would be a 
violation of the duty of loyalty whereas the second could violate loyalty or 
care, depending on whether the third-party manipulation resulted from a 
partnership with the fiduciary or was simply facilitated by its negligent 
design and oversight. 
Other types of manipulation attempt to surreptitiously sway users’ 
actions to the benefit of the collector and the detriment of the subject for 
solely commercial gain. Some products or services employ “dark 
patterns”—the architecture of a digital product or platform designed to 
induce certain behavior—in order to coax more information from the user 
than she would otherwise share,241 to persuade the user to use the service 
for longer or engage with more users while using the service, to spend 
more money, or to only spend money on certain products.242 In a 
particularly bleak example, Facebook reportedly told advertisers it could 
identify teens who felt “worthless” and “useless,” presumably so that they 
could be targeted for advertisements based on that vulnerability.243 Balkin 
argues that attempts by tech companies to make their products and services 
“addictive” should also violate the duty of loyalty as a form of 
manipulation.244 
Discrimination—whether directly perpetrated by the product or 
service or merely facilitated by it—could also violate the duty of care, 
loyalty, or both. Unlike with manipulation, a definition that requires the 
fiduciary to benefit from the detriment in order for a violation to exist 
would likely be unacceptably narrow. In context, an anti-discrimination 
principle is not foreign to fiduciary codes; the ethical rules for both 
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lawyers245 and doctors246 incorporate responsibilities to avoid 
discrimination in order to ensure equitable access to their services. Dobkin 
proposes that fiduciaries would be required to adhere to an anti-
discrimination principle, and taxonomizes three primary modes of digital 
discrimination: access to services, different prices, and refusing to offer a 
service in a certain area, with geography serving as a proxy for race 
(“digital redlining”).247 
In some cases, it may be relatively easy to demonstrate that a 
fiduciary is engaging in discrimination, as it continues to profit from a 
service that the company is aware is having discriminatory effects.248 The 
kind of “engaging” content that tech companies are incentivized to 
promote can often include racist or sexist content or harassment based on 
protected attributes, such as gender or race.249 Thus, a company’s failure 
to put the safety of its users over revenue or lax enforcement has 
disproportionate effects for the targets of harassment or the users whom 
an under-enforced policy was designed to protect.250 And just as a 
prohibition on manipulation as described above would not prohibit all 
targeted advertising, the application of the duty of loyalty or care to 
exclude discrimination would not prevent every way in which a service 
provider treats one group differently from another based on immutable 
characteristics, or adherence to a certain group. For example, a dating app 
would not be enabling discrimination by permitting users to only receive 
“matches” or messages from members of the genders they prefer, as 
opposed to mandating that all users receive matches from all genders. But 
a dating app that allowed users to search for matches based on ethnicity 
would likely be enabling discrimination.251 As demonstrated by the 
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volume of bad faith arguments raised in recent years about a non-existent 
specter of bias against conservative political views on online platforms,252 
any definition of discrimination should take care in establishing a standard 
of proof and defining the relevant standard of care. 
It is likely that manipulation and discrimination will often be found 
together, though again, the one should not require the other. While 
targeting certain users might exacerbate the degree of the violation of the 
duty of loyalty, it should not be necessary for manipulation to take place. 
For example, Facebook’s subjecting black users to be disproportionately 
targeted by Russian disinformation agents in order to persuade them not 
to vote for Hillary Clinton,253 on top of the company’s ignoring the needs 
of black users254 and being insufficiently cooperative with Senate 
investigations into interference with their platforms,255 would likely 
violate the duties of care and loyalty. Given that the people being targeted 
were selected on the basis of race, this could constitute both discrimination 
and manipulation, particularly given that the purpose of the manipulation 
was to deter people from voting, a protected activity. In contrast, Facebook 
making it appear as though users had notifications they couldn’t access 
until they accepted its new terms and conditions is no less manipulative 
for targeting all users instead of a subset of them256 because it 
surreptitiously exploited its users to their detriment, and to its benefit. 
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Some conduct might violate multiple duties at once. For example, 
various combinations of lax enforcement, direct manipulation, or enabled 
manipulation might violate both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. 
Consider Google’s Play Store, which forbids developers who participate 
in its “Designed for Families” program to use “overly commercially 
aggressive tactics” on child users.257 Yet in a white paper by Google-
owned AdMob, the digital advertising company advises developers on 
how to wring the most revenue out of its users, including “motivating” 
users who are “stuck” on a level.258 In a letter and subsequent complaint 
to the FTC, child advocates discussed how developers have used those 
very techniques in apps targeted to children in order to maximize revenue, 
such as making a puppy cry unless the user purchases accessories for her 
or having a well-loved children’s character express her disappointment 
that the child did not purchase an in-app skill.259 This kind of tactic 
manipulates children, whose judgment and understanding of commercial 
tactics are less developed than those of adults.260 One developer quoted in 
the AdMob whitepaper, TabTale, was found to employ those types of 
techniques in its child-directed apps.261 Google’s failures to enforce its 
Play Store policies would violate the duty of care, while its proactive 
encouragement, via its subsidiary AdMob, that developers try to 
manipulate its users into spending more money in Play Store apps would 
seem to violate the duty of loyalty. That Google was encouraging a 
developer that primarily makes children’s apps, and offers its children’s 
apps on the Play Store, to implement this manipulative technique also 
seems discriminatory towards children. 
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V. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
While the idea of applying fiduciary duties to data collectors has 
grown in popularity,262 it has also been subject to critique, notably by Khan 
and Pozen in their essay A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries.263 
While I share their skepticism towards the efficacy of an opt-in fiduciary 
regime, I do respectfully disagree with them on other points. Broadly, the 
authors argue that a fiduciary approach precludes badly needed structural 
reforms, and that it would reify the dominance of platform companies 
rather than eroding it, while strengthening an illusion of those companies’ 
trustworthiness that should instead be shattered.264 I believe a mandatory 
framework that creates significant obligations and prohibitions for data 
collectors would deter the kind of digital exploitation that the current 
ecosystem incentivizes, particularly when bolstered by an impactful 
enforcement regime and avenues for individuals to both exercise their 
rights and sue on the basis of their violation. It likely would not accomplish 
sweeping competition-focused reforms, but it does not purport to. Nor 
does it preclude additional statutory or regulatory competition-focused 
reforms, which I agree are needed.265 
The critique that a trust-focused approach might inure the perception 
of data collectors from the skepticism they deserve266 is also well-taken, 
though it again assumes the more conciliatory model of an opt-in regime 
that I agree is insufficient. The entire basis of fiduciary law is the 
assumption that fiduciaries are incentivized to take advantage of their 
clients unless the law somehow changes that calculus, such as by 
prohibiting self-dealing.267 The language of trust is not an empty 
assurance, or a congratulatory description that assumes that information 
fiduciaries have earned the trust they have been given: rather, it invokes 
the gravity of the obligation that U.S. privacy law has not previously 
required them to meet. The compulsory nature of the fiduciary status and 
robust enforcement of violations assumes inevitable abuse of that trust, 
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rather than presuming that data collectors deserve it and should not be 
scrutinized.268 
Khan and Pozen also argue that a business model based on behavioral 
advertising is fundamentally incompatible with a duty to put the well-
being of users first, which takes a narrow view of the types of business 
models that a fiduciary framework would hope to modify. While many of 
the abuses that a new law would hopefully fix stem from business models 
that are inherently harmful, others are the unintended consequence of the 
skewed priorities in an ecosystem with few applicable laws and limited 
enforcement. The issue is not always an intrinsically venal business model, 
but also ones where it is too easy for companies to leave questions of 
whether their product enables discrimination, manipulates users, or is 
likely to instigate third party misuse at the end of the product design cycle, 
rather than at the beginning.269 That critique also overlooks the 
transformative effect that shifting to the presumption that data collectors 
are responsible to their users, from the presumption that they generally are 
not, would have for the holes, lapses, and inefficacies of existing privacy 
law. And as noted supra,270 traditional fiduciary relationships also suffer 
from similarly recurring conflicts—the acknowledgement of inherent 
conflicts, and a desire to deter fiduciaries from taking advantage of them, 
is the fundamental premise of a fiduciary framework. 
The objective of this Article is not to suggest that fiduciary duties are 
necessarily a better approach than a system based on a constitutional right 
to privacy and data protection against private entities in a magical land 
where the U.S. Constitution contained such a specific right, or if scholars 
were to devise a sufficiently convincing theory that it does.271 Nor is it to 
suggest that an information fiduciary approach and the regulatory vision 
of the GDPR are mutually incompatible.272 They share many objectives, 
like protecting the dignity, autonomy, and privacy of individuals in the 
digital age, and certain approaches, such as significantly disincentivizing 
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misconduct273 through enhanced enforcement mechanisms. Both 
approaches attempt to protect individuals against broader classes of harms 
beyond privacy, such as algorithmic bias.274 Many U.S. companies do 
business in Europe and are required to comply with the GDPR; many EU 
citizens and U.S. customers of EU business have rights under the 
GDPR.275 Moreover, the focus of a fiduciary framework on the data 
collectors—what standards they should be required to meet, and what they 
should be prohibited from doing—could, and should, include certain 
affirmative individual rights like the ones the GDPR creates. The duty of 
loyalty or care, for example, could be written to incorporate any number 
of the GDPR’s individual rights, such as access, correction, and data 
portability.276 Many of the GDPR’s objectives and legal innovations are 
laudable, and should be emulated, as U.S. state lawmakers have already 
begun to do.277 
But in the U.S. legal system—lacking a constitutional right to 
privacy against all entities, limited by the First Amendment, and with a 
strong, historical and philosophical bent towards deregulation—a brick-
by-brick recreation of the GDPR is likely unrealistic. An information 
fiduciary framework can overcome those very roadblocks, while 
achieving the GDPR’s primary objective of restoring individual 
protections against digital harms.278 And while Congress certainly does not 
need to locate a right to privacy against private entities in the Constitution 
to create one by statute, a fiduciary model injects a moral imperative to 
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digital protections that the U.S. conception of privacy as a good frequently 
lacks. 
Moreover, the balance that fiduciary duties can strike between the 
legitimate commercial objectives of the provider and protecting the rights 
of the subject also coalesces with a U.S. privacy framework accustomed 
to allowing companies to move fast and break things, while preventing 
companies from breaking them quite so rampantly. It can meet a range of 
competing objectives without sacrificing the primary goal of strengthening 
protections for individuals against a range of evolving digital harms. 
Finally, an information fiduciary framework can coalesce with U.S. laws 
more easily than a wholesale import of the GDPR, as it can accommodate 
First Amendment rights that a GDPR clone would violate.279 Indeed, 
Balkin’s focus in proposing the value of a fiduciary framework was free 
expression, and how fiduciary duties could accommodate the First 
Amendment prerogatives of data collectors with privacy rights, not just 
their commercial objectives.280 
While an information fiduciary framework would inherently 
alleviate certain aspects of what ails the U.S. privacy ecosystem, other 
corrective elements are required for the framework to have its intended 
effect. First, for any new privacy law to significantly change the skewed 
balance of power between individuals and data collectors, it must modify 
the existing incentives for data collectors to ignore the law. In an 
environment of narrowly defined privacy laws, few private rights of 
action, a slim likelihood of regulatory enforcement, and tempered 
consequences in the unlikely event enforcement occurs, companies 
justifiably assume that the risk of violating the law is lower than the risk 
of failing to maximize growth and profits. Creating new rights for 
individuals by characterizing data collectors as information fiduciaries 
will do nothing without making it expensive or legally risky for companies 
to violate those rights. 
As such, assuming a proposal that still relies on the FTC as the 
primary privacy enforcement agency, the FTC must be given rulemaking 
authority and civil penalty authority, as well as more resources and 
manpower. The likelihood that a regulator will investigate lapses and 
breaches and that investigation will result in a meaningful fine or 
injunction must significantly rise for companies to put more resources and 
thought not only into compliance, but into prevention of misuse. A private 
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right of action would also push tech companies to invest more heavily in 
the welfare of its users. Hoofnagle et al. describe the GDPR’s objective as 
putting privacy law on par with the types of law that companies “take 
seriously”—namely, antitrust and foreign corrupt practices.281 An 
information fiduciary framework should do the same. 
Finally, expanding the type of harms a fiduciary should be held liable 
for also necessarily touches on questions of Communications Decency 
Act § 230.282 Under that statute’s broad liability shield, platform operators 
are not considered the “publisher or speaker of any information provided” 
by a third party on their platform and do not bear liability for good faith 
efforts to restrict certain kinds of harmful content, such as obscenity or 
harassment.283 Courts have interpreted § 230 quite broadly, and scholars284 
and advocates285 have argued that cabining the statute in any way will be 
the beginning of the end of online free expression and a vibrant internet 
ecosystem. Defining the harms that platforms should perhaps bear legal 
responsibility for—even after acknowledging that the harms are 
egregious—is certainly a delicate exercise,286 and one that has already 
gone awry once.287 But the robust evolution of the online platforms has 
demonstrated, as Danielle Citron and Ben Wittes memorably put it, that 
“the internet will not break,” if certain modifications are made to the law 
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in light of the harm they have simultaneously enabled.288 They argue for 
hinging § 230’s liability shield for platforms on their exercise of 
reasonable care,289 which would “reduce opportunities for abuses without 
interfering with the further development of a vibrant internet or 
unintentionally turning innocent platforms into involuntary insurers for 
those injured through their sites.”290 One can imagine a similar reworking 
of § 230 to include an exception to the liability shield when service 
providers violate the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, or confidentiality.291 
Olivier Sylvain, for example, argues that courts should account for how 
design choices enable or cause harm to “predictable targets of harassment 
and discrimination” when considering whether to extend § 230’s liability 
shield to platform intermediaries.292 While a full treatment of the issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article, there is clearly room for certain 
limitations to § 230’s extraordinarily broad liability shield without 
“breaking the internet.”293 
CONCLUSION 
The various interpretations of how fiduciary duties could be applied 
to data collectors discussed in this Article are united by a common theme: 
they restore a rights-type valence to a set of relationships that have been 
reduced to a commercial lens in U.S. privacy policy. Changing the default 
assumption that individuals are owed nothing by data collectors does not 
create a constitutional right like the ones undergirding the GDPR, but it 
does remove some of the obstacles standing between ostensible 
protections for digital autonomy and a meaningful ability for individuals 
and regulators to vindicate violations. Without contradicting the value and 
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potential of legal arguments for a constitutional right to privacy against 
private entities under U.S. law, nor arguing that one is needed in order to 
protect privacy rights by statute, an information fiduciary framework does 
not require such a right to protect individuals from privacy violations, 
manipulation, discrimination, and other violations of trust. As fiduciary 
scholar Tamar Frankel memorably put it, fiduciary duties restore 
“morality” to legal relationships that lack it.294 
In some ways, this proposal may sound radical—but so too is the 
extent to which the scales are tipped. U.S. privacy law needs a radical 
course correction, not a mere adjustment. A formal classification of data 
collectors as information fiduciaries simply recognizes the power 
imbalance that policymakers, academics, and industry can all see exists, 
and ascribes corresponding obligations to the individuals that the law 
otherwise permits those entities to exploit. 
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